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REVIEW ESSAY
Defining the Limits of Crime Control and Due
Process
by Hans Zeisel.t Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1982. Pp. xvi, 245. $20.00.

THE LIMITS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT;

Reviewed by Richard S. Frase$
In his latest book, Hans Zeisel argues that "law enforcement, important and essential as it is, cannot by itself significantly reduce crime"
(p. 15). Thus, he concludes, we should redirect our efforts toward general prevention, starting with improvements in ghetto schools. Zeisel's
thesis is supported by data from his study of the disposition of felony
arrests in New York City' and is supplemented by his assessment of the

results of recent criminal justice research in other jurisdictions. Zeisel, a
pioneer in the application of social science research methods to issues of
law and public policy, 2 presents a wealth of data in a very clear and
readable form, suitable for his primary intended audience: "the concerned citizen" and "those engaged in law enforcement and crime con-

trol" (p. 4). If such readers believe that improved law enforcement can
t Professor Emeritus of Law and Sociology, University of Chicago.
I Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. B.A. 1967, Haverford College; J.D. 1970, University of Chicago.
1. This study analyzed two samples of defendants. The first consisted of a randomly selected
group of 1,888 felony arrests made in 1971 in four of the five boroughs of New York City (excluding
Staten Island); the second included 369 defendants arraigned on felony charges whose cases reached
disposition between January and October of 1973 (pp. 8-10). The data in the first sample were based
on computerized court records as well as manual retrieval of information from the case files. The
data in the second sample were based on these same sources, but also included the results of interviews with the major participants in the case-i.e., the arresting police officer, defense counsel, prosecutor, and judge (pp. 8-10).
The basic data from the New York City felony arrest disposition study were previously reported
in a monograph published as VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, FELONY ARRESTS: THEIR PROSECUTION AND DISPOSITION IN NEW YORK CITY'S COURTS (1977) [hereinafter cited as VERA MONOGRAPH]. As discussed more fully below, see infra text accompanying note 18, Zeisel's analysis goes
considerably beyond the Vera Monograph in a number of important respects, although the latter
does report some information not contained in Zeisel's book.
2. See, e.g., H. KALVEN, JR. & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966); H. ZEISEL, SAY IT
WITH FIGURES (5th ed. 1968); H. ZEISEL, H. KALVEN, JR. & B. BUCHHOLZ, DELAY IN THE
COURT (1959); Casper & Zeisel, Lay Judges in the German CriminalCourts, I J. LEGAL STUD. 135
(1972); Zeisel & Diamond, Search for Sentencing Equity: Sentence Review in Massachusetts and
Connecticut, 1977 AM. BAR FOUND. RESEARCH J. 883.
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drastically reduce crime,3 they would do well to read this book. Zeisel
persuasively demonstrates the unlikelihood of ever achieving such reductions in this country, and perhaps in any Western democracy.
But there is a critical ambiguity in Zeisel's limits-of-law-enforcement thesis. Since he does not define what he means by "significant"
crime reduction, it is unclear whether he is only ruling out drastic reductions (for example, twenty-five percent or more), or whether he believes
that most American jurisdictions cannot even make noticeable, nontrivial, or statistically significant reductions in their present crime rates.
Perhaps he believes that law enforcement has so little impact that we
could even reduce enforcement levels without noticeably increasing the
incidence of crime. But whatever Zeisel's intent, the ambiguity of his
thesis-coupled with the forceful manner of its presentation-may well
lead his intended nonacademic readers to construe the thesis broadly.
Part I of this Review argues that Zeisel's data do not support such a
pessimistic assessment and concludes that there is much we still do not
know about the limits of law enforcement as a method of crime control.
Part I also addresses Zeisel's suggestion that we can achieve "significant"
crime reductions by improving our schools. This part of his thesis has
even less empirical support, and raises troubling issues if such improvements are to be achieved by taking resources away from the criminal
justice system.
Actually, much of Zeisel's book and its supporting data implies that
we should be spending more on criminal justice, not to achieve better
crime control, but to improve the quality of justice-its consistency, rationality, and fairness. Scattered throughout the book, but never stated
as forcefully or succinctly as the limits-of-law-enforcement thesis, is a
second thesis: that the criminal justice system is badly in need of reform,
particularly in the areas of plea bargaining and pretrial detention, and
that we need much better system-wide statistics and more studies like the
one in New York City to guide these reform efforts (pp. 51-52, 208-31).
This thesis is amply demonstrated by Zeisel's New York City data, but it
is likely to be overlooked by most readers, due to the book's overwhelming emphasis on the limits-of-law-enforcement thesis and to its unusual
3.

Such unrealistic expectations are not uncommon. See, for example, NATIONAL ADVISORY

& GOALS, A NATIONAL STRATEGY TO REDUCE
CRIME (1973), in which the Commission announced the following goals for crime reduction in the
COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS

10-year period 1973-83: the number of "high fear" crimes (i.e., murder, nonnegligent manslaughter,
forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, and burglary when committed by a stranger in public)
should be cut in half; and the number of all offenses listed above, whether or not committed by a
stranger, should be cut between 25% and 50% depending on the offense. Id. at 7. Although the
Commission noted that these goals are "aspirations, not predictions," it was "confident that by improved effort, including use of the standards and recommendations presented elsewhere in its reports, the goals can be attained." Id. at 8.
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organization (described below). Part II of this Review examines Zeisel's
implicit research-and-reform thesis and its supporting data and suggests
the important areas where we need further research and policy analysis.
It concludes that this thesis is more important for nonacademic readers
of the 1980's to understand and act upon than the limits-of-law-enforcement thesis that Zeisel chose to emphasize. Part II also concludes that
the book is at least as valuable to academics as to the intended audience,
and that it merits careful reading by anyone interested in criminal justice
research and reform. Such readers will find in Zeisel's book unique data
and research methods for measuring the impact of plea bargaining concessions on sentencing, a skillful blending of new and old data on almost
every aspect of criminal justice in New York City, and a model of how to
design and carry out system-wide research on law enforcement and criminal case processing.
Zeisel's book, like the criminal justice system itself, is schizophrenic,
recognizing both crime control and due process values. Indeed, this is
really two books in one, for two kinds of readers, and pointing toward
two very different conclusions. Both books are extremely valuable, but
each is likely to be misinterpreted or ignored by many readers. Nonacademic readers may interpret Zeisel's limits-of-law-enforcement thesis too
broadly, while disregarding his need-for-research-and-reform message.
Academics may not read the book at all, since it is not addressed to
them-yet the book presents unique data and research methods, critically important to improving the quality as well as the crime-control effectiveness of the criminal justice system.
The organization and focus of the book further limit its usefulness.
The limits-of-law-enforcement thesis and some of the New York City
data are presented in chapter one, which Zeisel characterizes as his conclusion, moved to an unconventional location. Chapters two through
five present the remaining data from the New York City study, which
Zeisel, in his words, has kept "deliberately lean, free from critical comment" to "allow the critical reader to appreciate the value of the findings
even if he or she disagrees with my reflections" in chapter one (pp. 4-5).
The resulting bifurcation of data presentation and analysis makes some
of the most important findings of the New York City study difficult to
understand. Moreover, Zeisel's preoccupation with his limits-of-law-enforcement thesis prevents him from fully developing the important research and reform implications of his data.
Thus, the purpose of this Review is to demonstrate the hidden virtues of Zeisel's book as well as its limitations, to show both how much
Zeisel has told us and how much we still need to learn about the crime
control and due process limits of law enforcement. Part I first examines
the limits of Zeisel's crime-control or limits-of-law-enforcement thesis.
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Part II then addresses his implicit-but more important-thesis: the
need for additional research about and reform of the criminal justice
system.
I
How LIMITED IS LAW ENFORCEMENT?
Zeisel's primary thesis is supported by the following data and
conclusions:
(1) "Attrition of law enforcement": even for serious felonies, the
rates of victim reporting, arrest, conviction, and sentencing are so low
that only three felons receive a felony prison sentence (over one year) for
every 1000 felonies committed in New York City (p. 18, figure 3);
(2) These high attrition rates are relatively stable in New York City
over time (p. 23, figure 6), and are similar to those found in other American jurisdictions (p. 22, figure 5) and in several European criminal justice
systems (p. 24, figure 7);
(3) It is difficult to increase arrest and conviction rates, given the
limited evidence available to the police and the frequent reluctance of
victims to report or persevere in their complaints (pp. 25-34);
(4) Substantial charge and sentence concessions are routinely offered in plea bargaining, but they can only be avoided by increasing the
cost of the system and lowering the conviction rate (pp. 51-52);
(5) The relatively large number of bail jumpers would be costly to
reduce, and would only improve conviction rates for offenses of lower
severity (pp. 51-52);
(6) Increased sentencing severity for the few convicted defendants
would not significantly increase incapacitative or deterrent effects (pp.
53-68); and
(7) The consistent relationship between crime rates and adverse social and economic conditions suggests that the criminal justice system
acts too late in the development of most offenders' criminality to have
any preventive or curative effects (pp. 68-87).
Zeisel thus concludes that crime prevention "must start early. The
place to begin is the nursery school" (p. 87). The school is the key because "it remains the only institutional point of access society has" to
these potential delinquents, and there is some data suggesting a causal
relationship between school absenteeism and delinquency. Moreover, we
must begin in nursery school because "[b]y the time boys enter high
school, criminal patterns may be firmly entrenched" (p. 87). In Zeisel's
idealistic vision, schools will "become cherished centers of the children's
lives"; ghetto teachers will be "only the princes and princesses of the
profession, who will establish bonds with their children that will hold

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:212

when the dangerous years begin and will endure until they are over" (pp.
87-88).
It is hard for any educator, parent, or idealist (I plead guilty on all
counts) to criticize such a vision, particularly in view of the sorry state of
many urban schools. In the best of all worlds, we would devote sufficient
resources to these schools to achieve Zeisel's vision and still have enough
left over to maintain at least a fair system of law enforcement, if not an
effective one. And, of course, there are many good reasons other than
crime control to improve our schools. Unfortunately, this is the age of
massive federal deficits and "retrenchment" of state budget allocations;
in such times, the danger is that money allocated to one good cause will
be taken away from others-particularly when two "causes" are viewed
as alternative ways of achieving the same goal.
The question then becomes one of relative marginal cost effectiveness: where will "the next billion dollars" do the most good? Zeisel argues that such resources will more effectively control crime if applied to
the educational system. However, as Zeisel recognizes, that system is
only one part of a "society that hesitates to grant full equality to the
young men from the ghetto" (pp. 87-88); his answer is that reform of the
schools must be just the beginning of our efforts to remove all of the
social conditions that cause crime (p. 88).
Equal opportunity and elimination of racial prejudice are, like
school reform, also highly laudable goals, and perhaps even more elusive.
The history and literature certainly suggest that criminal justice reform is
difficult and slow, but is broad social reform any easier? Perhaps Zeisel
assumes that the public is more willing to pay for school and social reform than for reform of the criminal justice system, although this remains to be demonstrated. Alternatively, he might argue that small
changes in the education system are more valuable at this point than
small changes in the criminal justice system, even if neither has any demonstrable impact on crime rates. Yet Zeisel's own data certainly
demonstrate the desperate need for reforms in the quality of criminal
justice, and may suggest that they would not be prohibitively expensive
(see Part II, below).
Since Zeisel has no data on the crime-reducing potential of school
and social reforms, his argument that such reforms are more crime-control cost effective rests on his demonstration of the limits of law enforcement. As noted previously, however, it is not clear how limited Zeisel
thinks law enforcement is. If he only rules out very large reductions in
crime through improved law enforcement, then his assumption that
school and social reforms can deliver greater reductions seems speculative at best. Such an assumption becomes more plausible the more limited law enforcement is shown to be, and seems quite probable if law
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enforcement has little or no impact on crime.4 If this is the case, school
and social reforms would indeed be the only reasonable alternative.
However, as discussed in some detail below, much of Zeisel's supporting
data about the limits of law enforcement are subject to a less pessimistic
(or at least, more agnostic) interpretation than he suggests. And if small
improvements in crime control are possible from each of a number of
reforms, the aggregate impact might well be substantial, at least for certain types of crime. Indeed, if our primary concern is with more serious
crimes and repeat offenders, then limited resources applied to the handling of these cases in the criminal justice system may well be more effective than the use of the same resources to make general improvements in
nursery school education.
Zeisel's overall "attrition" data is certainly dramatic. He makes the
argument that if only 3.6 percent of felons are convicted and only 0.3
percent are sentenced to prison for more than one year, it is unlikely that
criminal law enforcement can or will have any significant incapacitative,
deterrent, or rehabilitative impact (p. 18, figure 3). However, the data in
chapters two through four show that the more serious the offense, the
more likely it will be reported to the police and lead to arrest, conviction,
and incarceration (pp. 96, 98, 135-37, 163-64, 167, 169, 171, 173). Moreover, the attrition rates for offenses may understate the risk of eventual
apprehension and punishment for offenders who commit more than one
offense (p. 52, n.40)-the "we catch 'em sooner or later" theory. Zeisel
attempts to counter this theory in a footnote with speculation that such
habitual offenders may be more expert in avoiding arrest, confidently
concluding that "[n]one of these considerations alters the conclusion that
enforcement reforms, however necessary, will not significantly increase
crime control" (p. 52, n.40).
Zeisel's comparisons to other cities and countries also offer equivocal proof that conviction rates cannot be "significantly" increased. He
reports that conviction rates for felony arrests in other American cities in
the early 1970's varied between thirty-seven and sixty percent (p. 22, figure 5), which certainly suggests the possibility of "significant" improvement in some of these jurisdictions. Nor is sixty percent necessarily the
true "upper limit," since Zeisel's definition of a "conviction" apparently
does not include parole or probation revocation, or conviction on collateral charges.' These jurisdictions may also differ significantly in their
4. See supra text following note 3. Zeisel would not be the first writer to reach such a pessimistic conclusion. See, e.g., C. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 173-216
(1978). Charles Silberman's book is reviewed by Albert Alschuler in Book Review, 46 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1007 (1979).
5. I am assuming that Zeisel's definition of a "conviction" in these comparisons includes convictions on misdemeanor charges, since such cases are included in New York City "convictions."
Apparently none of the statistics includes information on parole or probation revocation, conviction
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conviction rates for specific offenses. Zeisel's comparison of prosecution
rates for robbery in New York City, Germany, and Austria is also unconvincing, since the rates are based on different definitions.6 I tend to
agree with Zeisel that "one may easily overestimate the effect of proce-

dural differences" between American and continental systems (p. 25,
n.5), 7 but his data do not demonstrate that such differences have no effect. Finally, as to both American and international comparisons, we
cannot look at a single step in the disposition process-arrest to conviction-and conclude that similar attrition rates demonstrate the "inher-

ent" limits of law enforcement, because such comparisons assume that
these jurisdictions all have similar attrition rates throughout the entire
disposition process. What we still need to know is whether any of these
jurisdictions succeeds in obtaining a significantly higher proportion of

convictions (or "weighted" convictions-that is, the conviction rate
times the average sentence severity) based on the total number of offenses
committed. Such system-wide comparisons might reveal that most juris-

dictions are even more similar than they appear in Ziesel's comparison.
But if variations of the same magnitude (thirty to sixty percent) (p. 22,

figure 5) remain, we should hasten to find out what the high conviction
rate jurisdictions are doing "right."
Zeisel's analysis of the dismissed cases in the New York City study
also leads him to conclude that dismissal rates cannot be significantly
reduced. He finds that the chief cause of dismissal is insufficient evidence, most often due to "withdrawal" of the victim (p. 26). Withdrawal
is particularly common when the victim and offender already knew each

other at the time of the offense. In such cases, the victim often considers
this prior relationship more important than prosecution (p. 26).1 Other
withdrawals occur because the witness has been intimidated by the deon collateral charges, or defendants already serving substantial prison terms for prior offenses.
These statistics also omit cases where the police chose to charge a misdemeanor rather than a felony.
6. The New York City prosecution rate is based on robbery arrests, whereas the European
rates are based on "known suspects whom the police could pick up," since European police do not
use custodial arrest as frequently as American police at the pretrial stage (pp. 24-25). It is not clear,
therefore, whether these figures are fully comparable. The arrest figures clearly represent a selected
group of total complaints with known suspects-namely, cases in which the police had a legal basis
to make an arrest and actually did arrest the suspect. If the legal power of the German and Austrian
police to "pick up" known suspects is greater, or if the term "known suspects whom the police could
pick up" assumes no exercise of discretion as to whether such suspects should be picked up, then the
denominator for the European "prosecution rates" represents a larger proportion of complaints than
the arrest figures used to compute the New York City rate. Such a definitional difference would tend
to understate the "superior" effectiveness of the European systems.
7. For example, French defendants have no Miranda right to remain silent or to have an
attorney present during police interrogation. However, American suspects usually waive their Mi.
randa rights. See, eg., Leiken, Police Interrogationin Colorado: The Implementation of Miranda, 47
DEN. L.J. 1 (1970), and authorities cited therein.
8. Assuming that this is sometimes a proper reason for dismissal, it is clearly not a sufficient
reason in all "prior relationship" cases. See infra text accompanying notes 79-81.
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fendant or his associates, or because the witness considers further cooperation too great a burden (in light of the number of hearings, distance to
court, and so forth) (p. 27). Zeisel proposes the use of a "Victim Services
Agency" to alleviate the latter problems, suggests that the wishes of the
victim should receive less weight in deciding whether to continue a case
(pp. 27-28), and concludes that such reforms could cut dismissal rates
"perhaps by some ten percentage points" (p. 51). However, another
cause of victim withdrawal-not mentioned by Zeisel-may be even
more important, and more easily remedied: the victim or other key witness may fail to appear in court simply because he or she did not know
when or where to appear! Recent studies suggest that improved police
records and witness notification procedures could substantially decrease
the incidence of witness "noncooperation." 9
Zeisel next concludes that "[b]arring radical changes in the size and
structure of the police force, it cannot do much better than it now does"
in narrowing the gap between crimes known and arrests made (p. 29).
For emphasis, he notes that the ratio of arrests to the number of committed crimes is even lower, since many crimes remain unreported, although
he does not discuss whether it would be possible to increase citizen reporting rates. Indeed, many of the reforms in the criminal justice system
that Zeisel considers unlikely to produce direct crime control effects
might very well improve public respect for the system, thus encouraging
more citizens to report offenses and cooperate with their prosecution. As
for the arrest rate, Zeisel notes that most arrests are made at or near the
scene of the crime, and that changes in police patrol and other strategies
have "on the whole failed to increase the arrest rates" (p. 31). However,
other studies-not cited by Zeisel-suggest that increases in the number,
deployment, or arrest policies of police can have positive crime-control
effects. 1
Zeisel's unique plea bargaining data virtually cry out for reform of
this sordid practice, but his principal focus is on the limits-of-law-en9. See, e.g., K. BROSI, A CROSS-CITY COMPARISON OF FELONY CASE PROCESSING 17-18
(U.S. Dep't of Justice 1979) (one-fourth of the "uncooperative" witnesses selected to be interviewed
could not be located because their names, addresses, or phone numbers were incorrectly reported at
the crime scene, and one-half of the remainder said that they did not receive an explanation of the
major steps in the court process; many did not even know where they were supposed to go and what
they were supposed to do); see also F. CANNAVALE, JR., IMPROVING WITNESS COOPERATION 5-19
(W. Falcon ed. 1976) (most witnesses interviewed denied being uncooperative, and some prosecutors
admitted overusing this rationale to justify dismissals to their supervising attorneys).
10. See, e.g., J. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 89-97 (1975); J. WILSON & B. BOLAND,
THE EFFECT OF POLICE ON CRIME (Urban Institute 1979). In a recent Minneapolis study, the
police were randomly directed to respond in one of three ways to domestic assaults not involving
actual or potential serious injury: with arrest, removal of the offender from the scene, or advice to
the parties. The study found that victims were almost twice as likely to be attacked again if the
police did not make an arrest. L. SHERMAN & R. BERK, THE MINNEAPOLIS DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
EXPERIMENT (Police Foundation 1984).
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forcement thesis. He therefore concludes that, overall, plea bargaining
reform will not significantly increase the punitive impact of the criminal
justice system. There is certainly data to suggest that limitations on plea
bargaining will increase the number of trials and decrease the number of
convictions and custody sentences, at least in the short run.It However,
as discussed more fully in Part II below, Zeisel's handling of his plea
bargaining data in chapter one is quite selective-both the complete data
in his later chapters, and other recent literature, suggest that it may be
feasible to eliminate at least some forms of plea bargaining without significantly increasing the cost of the criminal justice system or reducing its
punitive impact.
As for the problem of bail jumping, Zeisel is probably right that this
primarily affects cases of lower priority, and that efforts to reduce the
jump rate might require additional funding. Indeed, many of the defendants who jump bail may be unconvictable; thus, insuring their appearance will not increase the conviction rate. On the other hand, many
disappearing defendants may have been sufficiently "punished" by the
costs and hardships incurred up to the point of bail forfeiture, without
the need for "conviction." These alternative explanations might have
been addressed using the New York City data, but were not. More importantly, the injustices and irrationalities of the bail system call for immediate reform, whether or not this has any impact on conviction rates
or crime control, a subject discussed more fully in Part II.
Zeisel also argues, based principally on data other than the New
York City study, that greater sentence severity cannot significantly increase the incapacitative or deterrent impact of the law. As for incapacitation, he is probably correct that the doubling of prison sentences for all
armed robbers might have a limited effect on robbery rates, and, of
course, would be very expensive. However, he does not adequately discuss the possibilities of increased sentences for only the most risky offenders, and there is some empirical evidence to suggest that these
offenders can be identified on the basis of the length of their prior

records. 12
11.

See, e.g., K. CARLSON, MANDATORY SENTENCING: THE EXPERIENCE OF Two STATES

(National Institute of Justice 1982) (1973 New York drug law, which includes mandatory sentences
and restrictions on plea bargaining, produced more trials, motions, court appearances, and delay,
along with fewer indictments, convictions, and prison sentences in the three years following enactment); M. RUBINSTEIN, S. CLARKE & T. WHITE, ALASKA BANS PLEA BARGAINING 119 (National
Institute of Justice 1980) (abolition of prosecutorial plea bargaining increased the number of trials in
three Alaskan cities by an average of 37% in the first year).
12. See, e.g., P. GREENWOOD, SELECTIVE INCAPACITATION (Rand Corporation, Report No.
R-2815-NIJ, 1982); M. WOLFGANG, R. FIGLIO & T. SELLIN, DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT
163 (1972) (juveniles that have committed three or more offenses have a probability of 0.70 to 0.80 of
committing a further offense); Wolfgang, Delinquency in Two Birth Cohorts, 27 AM. BEHAVIORAL
SCIENTIST 75, 84 (1983) (probability of a male juvenile committing a sixth violent offense, given five
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Zeisel further argues that increasing the number of offenders sent to
prison would have less and less of an added incapacitative effect, since
the additional offenders would presumably be of lower risk than those
previously sent to prison. On the other hand, perhaps such low risk offenders would be more deterred by the prospect of prison than the more
hardened offenders we now commit, and in any case, we must also consider the general deterrent impact of increasing imprisonment rates
(which might be financed by reducing the length of imprisonment of all
offenders).
Zeisel rejects the possibility of increased deterrence, citing three
sources of data: (1) the lack of evidence that capital punishment deters
homicide; (2) the failure of the so-called "Rockefeller" drug laws to discourage heroin use and drug-related crime in New York state; and (3)
the lack of any demonstrable effect on subsequent criminality when a
group of 800 randomly selected prisoners were released nine months
early in California (pp. 60-65). These data, however, reveal very little
about the general deterrent effect of criminal sanctions, and particularly
the marginal deterrent effect of increased penalties for crimes such as
robbery and burglary. Capital punishment is clearly sui generis, both in
terms of the ability to deter homicides (most of which are impulsive and
not likely to merit the death penalty), and in terms of the perceived marginal difference between life imprisonment and the possibility of capital
punishment. As for the "Rockefeller" drug laws, any attempt to deter
heroin use in New York City faced an unusually difficult challenge, given
the limited deterrability of drug-related behavior by addicts, the scale of
the problem, and the predictable inertia of any system as massive as that
in New York City. As for the California study, such a temporary experiment could only be expected to have a "special deterrent" effect on the
prisoners themselves. In any case, it may very well be that rates of imprisonment are much more closely related to deterrent impact than
length of prison terms.
All deterrence studies are further limited by the fact that our standard indices of "crime"-police statistics-measure only a small portion
of the total number of crimes committed. Moreover, these measurements do not necessarily represent a constant proportion over time and
across jurisdictions.1 3 This methodological problem severely limits our
ability to detect and measure any deterrent effect of increased punishment. In short, there is much we still do not know about the deterrent
and marginal deterrent impact of criminal sanctions. Although Zeisel's
prior violent offenses, is 0.568). See generally Blumstein, Selective Incapacitation as a Means of
Crime Control, 27 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 87 (1983).
13. See generally F. ZIMRING & R. FRASE, THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: MATERIALS ON
THE ADMINISTRATION AND REFORM OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 46-81 (1980).
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conclusions may ultimately be borne out by further research, they are not
supported by the data he presents, nor does he make out a convincing
case for abandoning further research efforts and experiments with selective use of increased penalties for deterrent purposes.
Zeisel's argument against deterrence is also based in part on data
from the New York City study showing, for instance, that the risk of
being sent to jail after committing theft-motivated burglary is only 0.3
percent, and most jail sentences are for less than one year. He concludes:
"[W]hy should an increase of these sentences significantly affect their deterrent threat?" (p. 67). But one can just as easily speculate in the opposite direction: the lower the current level of sentencing severity, the more
likely it is that increased severity would increase the deterrent effect,
without risk of reaching the point of diminishing returns.
Zeisel is probably on strongest ground when he argues that any increase in general deterrence must be weighed against the strong possibility that sending young offenders to prison will make many of them worse
than they were before they entered. In many jurisdictions this is probably also true of jail sentences, certainly in the case of the former Manhattan House of Detention-the infamous "Tombs." But surely we must no
longer tolerate such conditions in our local jails. Indeed, in jurisdictions
where jails are relatively new, humane, and safe, the increased use of
short jail terms might well have a much greater deterrent than criminogenic effect.

14

Lastly, Zeisel argues that law enforcement "acts only after the
event, and it confronts the law breaker at a point in his life when it is
usually too late to change course" (p. 84). This argument leads naturally
to the conclusion that we must emphasize preventive efforts and work
with future criminals at a much younger age. There is no disputing the
point that better locks, better street lighting, indelible motor vehicle serial numbers, electrical antitheft devices, and so forth can have a major
crime-preventive impact, provided they are employed widely enough to
avoid simply displacing crime geographically.
Moreover, it may very well be that the best time to mold law-abiding character is in the earliest years of life. On the other hand, there are
practical and philosophical limits to the power of American government,
state or federal, to intervene and mold the character of its youngest citizens. In addition, much of the data on delinquency suggest that among
youth, crime is the rule and not the exception. Most youth engage in
some criminal activity, but what distinguishes criminal from law-abiding
adults is that the latter desist while the former continue to engage in
14. Zeisel concedes that at least at the lower end of the crime spectrum (e.g., drunken driving),
increased prison sentences have a deterrent effect (p. 58).
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criminal activity in their teens and early twenties."5 The criminal justice
system may indeed have a limited impact on these critical decisions to
desist or continue, but there are no data (at least that I am aware of) to
suggest that the system has no impact, or that its impact cannot possibly
be increased. Again, what we know about the causes of crime and the
primary determinants of criminal careers is dwarfed by what we do not

know. 16
One of the reasons we know so little about the effectiveness of criminal justice programs in producing deterrent, incapacitative, or rehabilitative effects has to do with the traditional conservative bias of social
science research. Social science presumes that programs have no effect
and will only discard this "null hypothesis" when confronted with overwhelming proof of effectiveness (typically 95 percent or 99 percent certainty that the results are not due to chance). However, statistically
"insignificant" differences, particularly when they continue to be found
in a number of independently conducted studies, may offer convincing
proof of program effectiveness. 7 Nevertheless, the message that the
criminal justice system and its programs are ineffective is a popular one
these days, because it clears the way for adoption of the "just deserts"
model of sentencing, based principally on the seriousness of the current
offense. Although the current debate over sentencing policy is beyond
the scope of Zeisel's crime-control focus, he implies disapproval of the
"just deserts" approach when he concludes that "retributionmust lose its
prestige as a rationale for punishment" (p. 74) (emphasis in original).
But what, then, are the purposes of punishment, if not either crime
control or retribution? Although Zeisel does not seem to embrace the
notion of "punishment for its own sake," both the title of his book and
the thrust of the conclusions in chapter one lend considerable support to
the antiutilitarian "new retributivism." All this is not to suggest that the
current preoccupation with consistency and proportionality in sentencing
is misplaced, but only that we must not conclusively presume that all
utilitarian purposes of punishment have been proven unattainable. For
those who prefer to focus on "just deserts," however, such a conclusion is
convenient.
15. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 43-44 (1967); M. WOLFGANG, R. FIGLIO & T. SELLIN,
supra note 12, at 162-63.
16. Although Zeisel does strongly encourage further research on effective means of treatment
during the correctional phase (p. 75), the current state of pessimism about "coerced cures" (or indeed any form of the "rehabilitative ideal") makes it highly unlikely that this recommendation will
be accepted and acted upon.
17. See generally Zeisel, The Significance of InsignificantDifferences, 19 PUB. OPINION Q. 319

(1955).
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II
ZEISEL'S MORE IMPORTANT MESSAGE: THE NEED FOR
RESEARCH AND REFORM

Following the introductory chapter entitled "Summary and Reflections," the remaining two-thirds of Zeisel's book is devoted to presenting

selected findings from the New York City felony arrest disposition study.
Some of this data was analyzed and reported in a monograph published
in 1977 by the Vera Institute of Justice."3 The Vera Monograph does a
more thorough job than Zeisel of presenting crime-specific data on disposition patterns, devoting separate chapters to the disposition of assaultive
crimes, robbery, burglary, grand larceny, and weapons cases. However,
Zeisel does a much better job of discussing certain aspects of disposition
and criminal justice functioning that cut across offense categories, such
as bail, prosecutorial screening, and plea bargaining. He also presents
important data, some of them not from the New York City study, that
place the arrest and disposition data in a broader context: estimates of
total crimes committed, including crimes not reported to the police; the
processes by which crimes are solved and arrests are made; the demographic characteristics of persons arrested; and the incidence of drug involvement in such persons.
Zeisel generally does an excellent job of presenting the data, using
easy-to-read charts that include enough information about the raw data
so that interested readers may explore different dimensions or problems.
He also presents a novel and very significant new research methodology
for exploring the nature of plea bargaining "discounts," and reveals some
of the important ways in which pretrial detention affects plea bargaining
and sentencing. However, in these two areas and several others, Zeisel's
"lean" presentation of his findings does not do justice to the richness of
the New York City data and its significant policy implications.
A.

Charge Reduction and Plea Bargaining

Zeisel uses innovative research methods to produce unique data on
both the nature of charge reductions offered as part of plea bargaining
and the estimated sentencing "price" exacted from the few defendants
who insist on going to trial. However, because the data are scattered
throughout chapters one, three, and five, and because of his preoccupation with the limits-of-law-enforcement thesis, the important implications for understanding and reforming the plea bargaining process are
not adequately developed.
In chapter one, Zeisel measures the plea bargaining "discount" in
two complementary ways. First, he examines the extent of charge reduc18.

VERA MONOGRAPH,

supra note 1.
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tions (for example, Class A felony to Class D felony). 19 Zeisel was able to
distinguish those guilty plea cases in which the evidence had "deteriorated" between arrest and disposition (average reduction: 2.8 crime
classes) and those where there was no deterioration (average reduction:
1.6 classes) (p. 36, figure 10). Second, for the seven defendants for whom
precise data was available, Zeisel examined the difference between the
most lenient sentence offered in plea bargaining and the sentence imposed after the defendant refused the offer and was convicted at trial (p.
43, figure 12). Figure 12 graphically illustrates the price of going to trial
in these cases: in the five cases where both sentences were custodial
sentences, the average sentence after trial was forty-two percent longer
than the lowest sentence offered for a plea, and where the plea offer was
probation, the two defendants who went to trial received custody
sentences of two and three years, respectively. Plea versus trial sentence
differentials of this magnitude seem very likely to produce what Zeisel
calls "the offer that cannot be refused" (p. 137).
Although Zeisel briefly notes the distorting effect that nonevidentiary charge reductions have on criminal records and statistics (p. 37)
and implies that the plea-versus-trial sentence disparities he discovered
are excessive and unjust (pp. 39-42), the main thrust of his discussion in
chapter one is the limits-of-law-enforcement thesis. He concludes that
plea bargaining reform offers little potential for increasing the punitive
impact of the criminal justice system, unless resources are substantially
increased. Later chapters present important additional data on the extent of deliberate police overcharging (pp. 195-99), charge reduction patterns (pp. 127-34), and plea/trial differentials in sentencing-including a
detailed, case-by-case analysis of twenty-one sample defendants who
went to trial, with emphasis on the apparent reasons for "plea bargaining
failure" (pp. 134-59). However, the later chapters contain little or no
policy discussion, and there are few specific cross-references in each
chapter to the pages elsewhere in the book where the same subject matter
is addressed.
The organization and dual focus of the book thus combine to undercut the value of Zeisel's unique plea bargaining data. Moreover, the data
19. At the time of Zeisel's study, New York law provided a perfect vehicle for prosecutorial
charge bargaining, with five classes of felony, two classes of misdemeanor, and lesser offenses known
as Violations and Infractions. For Class B and C felonies the minimum sentence was one year,
whereas for Class D and E felonies the minimum sentence was one day. In contrast, the highest
class felony-Class A--carried a minimum sentence of 15 years. The maximum possible sentence
for felonies of class A through E ranged from four years to life. Misdemeanors of Class A and B were
punishable up to one year and 90 days, respectively, with no minimum sentence (p. 128, table 4).
There were three classes of homicide, robbery, burglary, grand larceny, possession of stolen
property, forgery, and sale or possession of narcotics; four classes of rape and other sexual misconduct, and criminal trespass; one class of possession of a dangerous weapon; and five classes of assault
and related offenses. VERA MONOGRAPH, supra note 1, at 11-12.
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in chapters two through five contradict, to some extent, the conclusions
reached in chapter one. For example, six of the seven defendants discussed in chapter one received a higher sentence after trial than that offered for a plea. But of the twenty-one defendants whose cases are
analyzed in chapter three, only eight (thirty-eight percent) appeared to
fare worse by going to trial; eight defendants fared better, and five did
about the same.20 This reading of the data is consistent with what might
be called the "risk elimination" model of plea bargaining, in which the
parties agree on an intermediate disposition to avoid the more extreme
possibilities-for example, acquittal or a maximum sentence-that might
result if the case went to trial. 2 According to this model, plea bargaining "concessions," although sometimes extreme, are also often illusory.
This in turn suggests that "abolition" of plea bargaining would not necessarily produce any major change in the overall conviction rate and sentence severity. Viewed in this light, plea bargaining reform involves less
drastic change (and hence, is more feasible) than Zeisel's data in chapter
one would suggest.
Chapter three also clarifies a central ambiguity in the chapter one
data: the custody sentences imposed after trial are maximum sentences,
20. The 21 defendants analyzed in chapter three include the seven analyzed in chapter one.
The selection of these seven defendants was apparently based on the availability of information about
the precise sentence offered in return for a plea; if no plea offer was made, or the plea offer related
only to the type of sentence (e.g., "some prison") or a proposed charge reduction, no quantitative
comparison of the plea/trial differential could be made. Zeisel presumably also chose to exclude
acquittals for the same reason, although in at least one such case the plea offer (10 years) could have
been quantitatively compared to a "sentence" after trial of zero years.
My analysis of whether defendants did "better," "worse," or "about the same" at trial breaks
down as follows. The eight defendants who did "better" included five who were acquitted and three
who were convicted on lesser charges (cases 5, 6, 10). The eight defendants who did "worse" at trial
included six (also analyzed in chapter one) who received numerically higher sentences, and two
(cases 18 and 20) who were convicted of a higher level crime than was offered in return for a plea.
The five defendants who did "about the same" included the chapter one defendant (case 7) who
received the same sentence and crime level as offered in return for a plea, three defendants (cases 9a,
11, 15) who were found guilty at trial of the same charges they were asked to plead guilty to, and one
defendant (case 12) who did both worse and better at trial-i.e., he was found guilty of a Class D
felony (the plea offer was for Class A misdemeanor) but received a sentence of probation (the plea
offer contained no assurance of avoiding jail).
21. Cf. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 652, 683-716
(1981), which criticizes recent theories characterizing plea bargaining as a form of dispute resolution
allowing the parties to "justify 'intermediate' dispositions by which both sides avoid the risks of
litigation." Id. at 652.
The variable results at trial may include more than the risks of acquittal versus the increased
sentence caused by denial of charge concessions or favorable sentence recommendations. Defendants may be found guilty of lesser offenses at trial than those offered in return for a plea, and differences in judicial sentencing policies may add a further element of variation, both up and down from
the sentence agreed to in a plea bargain. In courts where the identity of the trial judge is not known
until the day of trial, plea bargaining serves as a way of evening out such sentencing disparities. The
judge may accept a more moderate, negotiated sentence than that which he or she would have
imposed after trial.

1985]

REVIEW ESSAY

subject to considerable parole discretion (p. 153).22 Thus, the true plea/
trial differential is probably less than that suggested in chapter one. Of
course, for the two defendants in chapter one who were offered probation
for a plea, the two- and three-year sentences they received after trial had
to represent increased punishment, assuming that the trial judge would
have accepted a plea in return for probation in such cases.2 3 These two
cases, therefore, illustrate a type of plea bargaining that may be particularly coercive: the offer of probation where there is at least a substantial
risk that the trial judge would impose a custody sentence.2 4
Both in chapter one and chapter three, Zeisel recognizes a further
methodological problem posed by comparison of plea versus trial
sentences: Are the relatively few defendants who went to trial representative of the mass of defendants who pleaded guilty, so that the sentence
differentials imposed on the former can be taken as indicative of the additional punishment which would have been imposed on the latter, had
they gone to trial? Zeisel's data on charge bargaining suggest that defendants who plead guilty are receiving substantial concessions in the
level of conviction they could expect if they went to trial: an average
reduction of 2.3 crime classes (p. 132, figure 34). He discounts the significance of this data as a measure of potential plea/trial differentials, since
in most cases the trial court would have had discretion to impose a lower
sentence even if a defendant was charged with and convicted of a higher
class crime (pp. 35-37). However, an earlier quantitative study of
Manhattan practices concluded that "the conviction charge appears to be
the most important determinant of the sentence length."2 5 Thus, charge
22. The trial sentences of all seven defendants discussed in chapter one were prison terms, the
shortest being two years. For some of these sentences parole eligibility could occur immediately, and
in no case would the defendant have had to serve more than one-third of the maximum sentence
before being eligible for parole (pp. 128-29).
23. In one case discussed in chapter three (case 16, p. 156), the "last offer" of a plea bargain
was made at trial (Class C felony with a 15-year sentence). The defendant agreed to this, but the
trial judge refused to accept the plea. This case suggests a methodological problem applicable to all
of Zeisel's "last-offer" versus trial-sentence comparisons. Future researchers using this method must
attempt to verify that most trial judges in the court would have accepted pleas based on each "last
offer" discovered.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 34-42 for a discussion of several other "worst types" of
plea bargaining.
25. Shin, Do Lesser Pleas Pay?: Accommodation in the Sentencing and Parole Process, 1 J.
CRIM. JuST. 27, 35 (1973); see also Alschuler, The Prosecutor'sRole in Plea Bargaining,36 U. CHI.
L. REv. 50, 97 (1968). Alschuler characterized Manhattan as a system "where bargaining concerns
the level of the charge rather than the prosecutor's sentence recommendation," id., whereas Zeisel's
data imply that the bargaining relates more directly to the sentence. Zeisel reports that of all guilty
pleas, only 6% involved "no assurance on sentence," 22% involved no assurance but did involve a
charge reduction, and 72% involved an "assurance on sentence"; in 21% of the latter pleas, the
"judge merely accepts [the] deal," while in 79% the "judge participates in [the] negotiation" (pp.
133-34, figure 35). It is possible, of course, that plea bargaining changed in New York City between
the mid-1960's and the mid-1970's. By 1974, however, the Manhattan District Attorney had issued
internal guidelines that explicitly sanctioned limited charge bargaining and prohibited all sentence
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reductions, unless somehow illusory, must produce substantial plea/trial
sentence differentials.
One interpretation of the charge reduction data is that it simply reflects reduction to the probable level of conviction at trial-that is, an
illusory "discount." The need for such a reduction can arise because the
case was initially overcharged, because the evidence has deteriorated
since the initial charging, or simply because the requirements of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt are higher than the standard of probable
cause applied at the time of initial charging. Zeisel's in-depth analysis of
"evidence deterioration" in chapter one sheds some light on this matter,
but leaves several important questions unanswered. For example, we are
told that the evidence had deteriorated in sixty percent of the guilty plea
cases, leading to an average charge reduction of 2.8 classes; in the remaining forty percent, the average charge reduction was only 1.6 classes
(p. 36, figure 10). We are not told whether the "deterioration" in the first
group appears to justify the specific charge reduction granted-reductions in such cases could be considerably more, or less, than the evidence
problems would indicate. Neither do we know whether all of the cases in
the "no-deterioration" group were appropriately charged in the first
place. Those cases may have been weak to begin with, or may have been
undercharged. Without answers to these questions, we cannot estimate
the probable after-trial sentences of defendants who chose to plead guilty
instead.
In chapter five, Zeisel analyzes the problem of "overcharging" and
concludes that only seven percent of all arrests involved a "deliberate
overcharge, where the police know that the facts will not sustain the
charge"-mostly cases of resisting arrest or assaults on the police (p.
196). These data are not specifically related to the earlier data on charge
reduction. It is not clear whether these seven percent are considered
cases of "deteriorated" evidence. Zeisel also discusses the "well-established and to some extent defensible police practice of lodging the maximum charge against a defendant that is compatible with the available or
expected evidence" (p. 195), but does not provide any quantitative estimates of the frequency of this practice, nor does he relate it to the data
on "deterioration."
If we could statistically take into account all of the types of charge
reduction that reflect case weaknesses and thus merely anticipate trial
disposition, it is possible that the average "real" charge reduction would
be even less than 1.6 crime classes. Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that the differential between sentence after plea and the probable
bargaining. See Kuh, Plea Bargaining: Guidelinesfor the Manhattan District Attorney's Office, 11
CRIM. L. BULL. 48 (1975); Kuh, Sentencing: Guidelinesfor the Manhattan DistrictAttorney's Office,
11 CRiM. L. BULL. 62 (1975).
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trial sentence for the mass of defendants who plead guilty remains substantial. Zeisel's chapter three analysis of the twenty-one defendants
who went to trial shows that six of the eight convicted defendants who
did as well or better by refusing to plead guilty had some realistic basis
for expecting at least a partial acquittal, or had some other understandable reason for demanding a trial (pp. 143-47, table 5).26 In contrast, six
of the eight defendants who did worse at trial had a likelihood of acquittal rated by Zeisel as poor or very poor, and none had any other "good
reason" for demanding trial.2" Such a distinction between the relatively
"good" and "bad faith" exercise of trial rights has been suggested in
dicta by a number of courts. z8 The distinction is obviously very difficult
to administer, and is philosophically repugnant to those who believe de29
fendants have an "absolut6" right to put the government to its proof.
But if such a distinction is accepted by judges in New York City, one
might expect that many defendants who currently plead guilty would
have to fear the imposition of a substantial "bad faith" penalty if they
insisted on a trial.
What we need are further data, not speculation, and Zeisel suggests
a very interesting research design for obtaining it. He proposes that the
plea-bargained cases be described to nonparticipating defense counsel,
prosecutors, and judges, and the hypothetical question posed: "If in this
26. The six defendants were those numbered 5, 6, 7, 9a, 10, and 12. Although defendant 12's
likelihood of acquittal was rated "poor," the defendant understandably refused the plea offer, which
did not include an assurance of no jail time, since the charge and defendant's record presented "a
combination that hardly ever brings jail" (p. 154). Not surprisingly, four of the five defendants who
were acquitted had at least "some" perceived likelihood of acquittal.
27. The six defendants were numbers 13, 14, 16, 18, 19, and 20. The most questionable inclusion in this list is number 18, who apparently went to trial because his "powerhouse" of a mother
insisted on the trial of her "innocent" son (pp. 157-58). This resulted in his conviction for a Class B
felony, instead of the Class C felony offered for a plea.
28. See, e.g., United States v. Stockwell, 472 F.2d 1186, 1187 n.1 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 411
U.S. 948 (1973) (defendant may not be penalized for standing trial, at least if innocence is asserted in
"good faith"); United States v. Wiley, 278 F.2d 500, 504 (7th Cir. 1960) (defendant may not be
"punished because in good faith he defends himself wheu charged with crime, even though his effort
proves unsuccessful"); In re Lewallen, 23 Cal. 3d 274, 276, 590 P.2d 383, 385, 152 Cal. Rptr. 528,
530 (1979) (invalidating a higher sentence imposed after trial on defendant whose "intransigence was
vindicated" when he was convicted of one charge and acquitted of all the remaining charges that the
prosecutor had refused to drop in plea bargaining); cf People v. Morales, 252 Cal. App. 2d 537, 542
n.4, 60 Cal. Rptr. 671, 675 n.4 (1967) (reversing a higher sentence imposed after trial by a court
which observed, inter alia, that "there was no effort to put on a defense because there couldn't be").
Alschuler, Implementing the CriminalDefendant's Right to Trial: Alternatives to the PleaBargaining System, 50 U. CI. L. REv. 931, 1046-48 (1983), also suggests that any system of jury-waiver
bargaining that replaces plea bargaining should impose no "jury tariff" in "triable" cases where the
"defendant has raised issues that a jury ought to have heard." Alschuler also reports an interview
with a judge in a court that had "prohibited" plea negotiation, who stated that a defendant who went
to trial with "no plausible defense ought to receive a more severe sentence." Id. at 944 n.75.
29. Apparently no such absolute right exists in civil litigation, where parties can be assessed
costs for unjustifiably requiring their opponent to prove the obvious. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c)
(expenses on failure to admit).
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case the jury would find the defendant guilty, what sentence is he likely
to get?" (p. 141).30 However, since many cases involve problems of
proof, multiple charges, or possible lesser offenses, it would probably also
be necessary to describe the evidence available and ask the judges and
attorneys to assume the "most likely" verdict. This methodology might
also reveal the existence of any "good faith/bad faith" distinction.
Future research should consider the impact of other powerful inducements to plead guilty, beyond the offered charge or sentence concessions. Although Zeisel's discussion of the impact of pretrial detention on
conviction rates and sentencing patterns clearly identifies pretrial custody as a potent cause of guilty pleas, the limitations of his data prevented him from analyzing the precise relationship between the plea
offer, plea acceptance, release from pretrial detention, and sentence imposed.3" Other important factors bearing on plea negotiation-noted but
not discussed by Zeisel-include the identity, if known, of the trial
judge, 2 the financial costs of going to trial, whether such costs are borne
by the defendant or by the public defender's office, and the possibility of
parole or probation revocation based on the current offense.3 3 Of course,
analysis of all of these factors requires large samples, high-quality and
easily accessible data, and a complex analysis of interrelated variables.
Zeisel's approach is more manageable, but does not ultimately tell us
how significant plea bargaining concessions are, nor what would happen
if such concessions were limited or abolished.
However, we need not await the results of further research to begin
our reform efforts. Zeisel's data amply illustrate several forms of plea
bargaining that should be regulated or prohibited. Granted, all forms of
plea bargaining may be inherently coercive and a source of unjustified
plea/trial sentencing disparities, but some forms are worse than others,
and it is important to try to identify and selectively curtail those types
30. Zeisel tried to apply this methodology to the participants in his sample guilty-plea cases,
but the effort failed because the "defense lawyers tended to overstate the size of the differential in
order to magnify their achievement[s; prosecutor and judge had the opposite tendency because too
large a differential seemed difficult to justify" (p. 141).
31. This subject is more fully discussed, infra Part II, Section B.
32. The author notes that in some jurisdictions the potential plea versus trial differential is
increased by assigning cases of hesitant defendants to trial judges known for their sentencing severity

(p. 40).
33. In at least one case discussed by Zeisel (case 210, p. 183) the 10-month sentence received
after the defendant went to trial may have been insignificant, since it was concurrent with a two-year
sentence he owed on a parole violation.
Another potential cause of guilty pleas may be the nature of the defendant's prior record. Cf
VERA MONOGRAPH, supra note 1,at 21, table F (data showing a strong correlation between severity
of prior record and probability of conviction). It would be illuminating to see how many defendants
who pleaded guilty had prior convictions for "impeachable" offenses. A plausible hypothesis is that
defendants with such records are advised that they will be convicted at trial whether or not they
testify.
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even if total abolition of plea bargaining seems unfeasible or even undesirable. My own list of "worst types" includes life versus death (penalty)
pleas;3 4 in (prison) versus out bargains;3 5 and most forms of charge bargaining,36 particularly nonevidentiary charge reductions-that is, reductions below the level at which the defendant would probably be found
guilty if the case went to trial (for example, reducing a clear case of
armed robbery to unarmed robbery, a procedure known as "swallowing
the gun"). As Zeisel points out, such charge bargains distort the true
seriousness of the defendant's acts, and render court and criminal history
records unreliable, but they are worse than noncharge-bargained sentence concessions for several additional reasons.
First, nonevidentiary charge bargaining allows prosecutors to exercise what is essentially judicial sentencing power by limiting the maximum sentence available to the judge and forcing the court either to defer
to the prosecutor's characterization of the offense or to violate legal
norms by engaging in "real offense" sentencing.3" Second, nonevidentiary charge bargains undercut presumptive or determinate sentencing
34. See United States v. Brady, 397 U.S. 742, 751 (1970), and other death penalty cases cited
by the author (p. 41, nn.23, 25).
35. See supra text accompanying note 24; see also Alschuler, The TrialJudge's Role in Plea
Bargaining (pt. 1), 76 COLUM. L. Rav. 1059, 1124-25 (1976) (suggesting that a system of partial
abolition of plea bargaining "might be built upon the principle that the entry of a guilty plea should
never make the difference between one kind of punishment and another but should merely reduce
the quantum of a particular type of punishment"); Coffee & Tonry, Hard Choices: CriticalTradeoffs
in the Implementation ofSentencingReform through Guidelines, in REFORM AND PUNISHMENT 155,
166-69, 170 (M. Tonry & F. Zimring eds. 1983) (noting the coercive power of charge bargains that
enable defendants to avoid a presumptive sentence of imprisonment).
36. See Alschuler, supra note 35, at 1136-46. Certain other "worst types" of plea bargaining
could be cited-e.g., bargaining over such fundamental issues as identification, or bargaining to
avoid the legal determination of constitutional issues-but these types of bargaining may be taken
care of by the limits on charge bargaining discussed in the text.
In its 1979 revision of the standards related to guilty pleas, the American Bar Association seems
to have taken the opposite approach to that suggested here, sharply limiting the legitimacy of judicially imposed plea/trial sentencing differentials, but refusing to challenge the prosecutor's power to
produce such differentials through charge bargaining. Cf STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Pleas of Guilty § 14-1.8(a) (2d ed. 1982) (rejecting certain judicially imposed differentials allowed
under the 1968 version of the standards); id. §§ 14-3. l(a), 14-3.3(b) (permitting prosecutors to make
charge bargaining concessions, and taking no position on whether courts should be given the authority to approve or reject such concessions in jurisdictions that do not already grant such a power); see
also id. § 14-3.3(b) commentary.
37. See Alschuler, supra note 28, at 1045-46, and authorities cited therein.
In practice, of course, prosecutorial sentence bargaining also usurps judicial power, since judges
often adopt specific sentence recommendations uncritically. Maintaining a high volume of guilty
pleas requires that courts rarely disappoint the sentence expectations created by the prosecutor's
proposed concessions, of whatever variety. Alschuler, supra note 35, at 1061-76. However, sentence
bargaining also allows judges to control the sentence indirectly, by letting it be known that they will
not accept recommendations of less than a certain minimum for each offense. Id. at 1065. It may be
harder for trial courts to establish such lower limits in a system of charge bargaining, since the court
is entitled to assume that the charge reduction-even a drastic one-was necessitated by evidentiary
problems, which are traditionally the prosecutor's sole concern. In any case, courts in most jurisdic-
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reforms; in states that have adopted such reforms, the potential sentence
differential that can be imposed without a charge reduction is limited,
but charge bargaining still permits huge plea/trial differentials as well as
unjust disparities among defendants who plead guilty.38 Similarly,
charge bargaining limits the power of the parole board-at least one adhering to an offense-based "matrix"-to moderate plea/trial and other
sentencing disparities.3 9
As for charge bargains that involve dropping charges for evidentiary
reasons, such as evidence deterioration and overcharging, there are fewer
problems of distorted conviction records and plea/trial disparities. However, the potential coercive effect on poorly informed defendants may be
even greater, since, as noted earlier, the charge reductions are greater. In
any case, such illusory bargains are fundamentally dishonest and the
availability of such bargains encourages prosecutors to overcharge the
case initially.' Zeisel seems to accept the necessity of such charge reductions, perhaps because he recognizes that unsupportable charges must be
dropped at some point. The problem is to devise procedures that require
such charges to be dropped whether or not the defendant pleads guilty.
One procedure would involve a charging cutoff point: on or before a
fixed date, the prosecution would be expected to make its final screening
decisions, dropping all charges that it does not intend to pursue at trial. 41
Some system of costs or other incentives may be necessary to enforce this
procedure. If the cutoff date is sufficiently in advance of trial, this would
permit the defendant to make an informed plea decision based on the
tions have no authority to reject charge-bargained pleas without resorting to the extreme measure of
finding the plea "involuntary."
38. See generally Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and ProsecutorialPower: A Critiqueof Recent
Proposalsfor 'Fixed' and 'Presumptive' Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 550, 555-77 (1978).
39. Of course, parole boards have often based their decisions on dismissed as well as convicted
charges-the so-called "silent beef"-a practice that undercuts both the legitimacy and the accuracy
of parole board determinations. See Alschuler, supra note 25, at 96.
40. Alschuler, supra note 35, at 1143-44.
41. Cf.Alschuler, supra note 28, at 967-68 & n.163 (proposing the use of a "waiting period"
between any downward revision of the charges and the time when defendants could enter a guilty
plea; the proposal is attributed (without citation) to Professors John C. Coffee, Jr. and Michael
Tonry); Parnas & Atkins, Abolishing Plea Bargaining: A Proposal, 14 CRIM. L. BULL. 101, 119-21
(1978) (proposing an early "charge-setting hearing" after which further revisions in the charge
would require the prosecutor to present "significant new information" to the court).
To prevent charge bargaining in the period before the cutoff, it would be necessary to prohibit
entry or tender of any plea to less than all ofthe charges. The idea is to insure that the prosecution is
bound to its final charges before the defendant is in any way bound to his plea; under such circumstances, the prosecutor could not make pre-cutoff charge reductions with any assurance that the
defendant would uphold his end of the bargain. However, prosecutors could still evade the cutoff by
initially filing reduced or fewer than all available charges (while threatening to add higher or additional charges just before the cutoff date if the defendant has not yet pleaded guilty to the original
charge). To prevent this ploy, it might be necessary to forbid even "straight pleas" before the cutoff
date; alternatively, the addition of charges could be prohibited (except on a showing of newly obtained evidence).
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"real" charges likely to lead to conviction at trial.4 2
B.

PretrialRelease and Detention

The New York City felony arrest disposition study produced unique
data on pretrial release decisions, and on the relationship between pretrial custody and case disposition. Zeisel presents this data clearly, while
identifying and discussing most of its major policy implications.
Although the data are discussed in several chapters of the book, this
topic presents fewer problems of cross-referencing, cohesiveness, and internal consistency than the plea bargaining data discussed above. Still,

the major policy discussion of pretrial release problems is found in chapter one, where the emphasis is on increasing the crime-control impact of
the criminal justice system. This leads Zeisel to focus on the failure-toappear problem, giving less emphasis to the equally important problems
of detaining persons unnecessarily, using pretrial detention to coerce
guilty pleas, and misusing the money bail system to achieve a de facto
preventive detention.43 He concludes that the proportion of bail jumpers
42. A similar cut-off rule would be applied to the addition of new charges, to prevent prosecutors from upping the ante in the manner approved by the Supreme Court in Bordenkircher v. Hayes,
434 U.S. 357, 360-65 (1978) (filing of habitual offender charge leading to mandatory life imprisonment, when defendant refused to plead guilty to forgery in return for a five-year sentence, did not
constitute unconstitutional "vindictiveness" in violation of due process).
When there are collateral charges (extra counts, pending cases, and so forth) not governed by
local joinder or "single behavioral incident" rules, it may be more difficult to devise a workable cutoff procedure. Even if such collateral charges are not dropped, however, defendants should at least
be given accurate information about the probable sentencing impact of such charges, since many
judges decline to sentence consecutively.
43. The legitimate purposes of detention (and other limitations on the pretrial liberty of the
accused) have not been clearly defined by the courts. The eighth amendment prohibition of "excessive" bail does not necessarily create a constitutional right to have bail set, see, e.g., United States v.
Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. 1981) (en banc), nor does it clearly define the factors that courts may
consider in setting or denying bail. The leading bail case in the Supreme Court, Stack v. Boyle, 342
U.S. 1 (1951), suggested in dicta that the only constitutionally recognized purpose of bail is to assure
the defendant's appearance at trial, but the possibility of other purposes was not relevant to the
disposition of that case. One such purpose-prevention of further crime by the accused in the period
prior to trial-was explicitly recognized in a 1970 federal statute applicable to "local" (i.e., not
federal) offenses tried in the District of Columbia; that purpose, and the statute implementing it,
were upheld in the Edwards case. Preventive detention of juveniles has also recently been upheld by
the Supreme Court. See Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984). Chapter I of the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 201-203, 98 Stat. 1976, 1976-85 (1984), contains
an adult "preventive detention" provision applicable to all federal offenses, so it seems likely that the
legality of such detention will soon be decided by the Supreme Court. Regardless of how the issue is
decided, however, it has long been recognized that judges can achieve preventive detention without
express statutory authorization by simply setting money bail at a figure higher than the defendant
can afford. See infra text accompanying notes 76-77.
Pretrial detention can also be viewed as serving several additional purposes. Closely related to,
but distinct from, preventive detention is the goal of preventing the defendant from threatening
witnesses, tampering with the evidence, or otherwise improperly interfering with prosecution of the
charges. See infra text accompanying notes 73-74. This purpose has been approved by the courts, at
least where it can be shown that the defendant has already threatened one or more witnesses. See
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in the New York City sample, (nine percent of all defendants released or

about six percent of total defendants) is excessive, and must be brought
down by more active enforcement of warrants for bail jumping and more
regular collection of forfeited bonds.

Apart from the failure-to-appear issue, Zeisel's major focus in chapter one is the effect of pretrial detention on case disposition. He concludes that pretrial detention causes increased conviction and custody
sentence rates among detained defendants and suggests the mechanism
by which this effect is produced: the so-called time-served plea. Custody
sentences are more common among defendants held in pretrial detention
because "the judge will be tempted to impose a custody sentence equal to

the time spent in detention, thereby legitimizing the past detention" (p.
47).' The defendant in pretrial detention is also more likely to be convicted because, at some point, he will have served a period of detention
equal to the prosecutor's proposed sentence, and can be released immedi-

ately in return for his plea of guilty. Continued insistence on trial (assuming trial is not immediately available) can, therefore, only yield
further "unnecessary" detention.
The data presented in chapter five provide further support for
Zeisel's chapter one conclusions. Data are first presented on the nature
of the money bail, if any, required by the court, and whether or not it was
posted by the defendants. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, given the long
history of bail reform in New York City, only thirty-four percent of the
defendants were released on recognizance, and almost one-third did not
United States v. Gilbert, 425 F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Pretrial detention also serves to coerce
guilty pleas, testimony, and other forms of cooperation; assures the defendant's availability for interrogation or identification procedures; and results in the speedy imposition of informal punishment
on defendants who may never be convicted or given a formal custody sentence. See infra note 75
and accompanying text. No court, statute, or rule has ever endorsed these purposes, nor probably
ever will, but they are easily achieved by setting high money bail under the guise of assuring the
defendant's appearance at trial.
44. Although Zeisel limits his conclusion to defendants who plead guilty after having spent
some time in jail, the need to "legitimize" past detention seems equally applicable to defendants
found guilty at trial.
45. Cf. Mills, I have nothing to do with Justice, LiFE, March 12, 1971, at 56, 62:
"When will [trial] be?"
"In a couple of months. Maybe longer."
Santiago has a grip on the bars. "You mean if I'm guilty I get out today?"
"Yes."
"But if I'm innocent, I got to stay in?"
"That's right."
Even if a defendant's plea does not secure his immediate release from jail, the usual practice of giving
credit for any time spent in pretrial detention against a prison or longer jail sentence means that the
longer the defendant stays in pretrial detention, the less time he has remaining to serve if he is found
guilty or pleads guilty. A released defendant, on the other hand, encounters no such decreasing term
of the sentence he would have to serve if convicted. For further discussion of different types of
"time-served" pleas, see infra text accompanying notes 51-52.
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obtain release, at least not immediately.4 6 Zeisel then discusses the inherent problems of any pretrial detention system-that some defendants will
be detained who would pose no risk of nonappearance (henceforth, "false
positive" predictions of risk), whereas other defendants will be released
who then fail to appear ("false negatives"). He concludes that we cannot
measure the extent of the false positive problem without conducting a
controlled experiment in which more defendants in the experimental
group are released than in the randomly selected control group. We can
measure the false negative rate, however, by analyzing the incidence of
failures to appear. Zeisel presents data from the New York City study
suggesting that the great majority of nonappearing defendants have little
to fear in terms of sentencing severity, based on the crime charged and
their criminal record. From this finding, he concludes that these defendants failed to appear primarily because the "consequences of disappearing are negligible" (p. 217), which in turn suggests that such
consequences should be made more onerous.
Finally, Zeisel presents considerable data from the New York City
study suggesting that defendants in pretrial custody are more likely to be
convicted and receive custodial sentences than defendants who make
bail. Recognizing that the bail decision may be based on the perceived
likelihood of conviction and custodial sentence, he attempts to control
for the crime charged, the defendant's prior record, and the strength of
the evidence, and finds that the adverse position of the defendants in jail
still holds within the smaller, presumably more comparable groups of
bailed and jailed defendants. He also presents some case histories illustrating the use of the time-served plea.
As Zeisel points out, there are a number of factors other than the
time-served plea that we might expect to contribute to the greater likelihood of conviction and custody sentence for detained defendants: lesser
ability to consult with counsel and assist in preparation of the defense,
lesser ability to afford the services of investigators and expert witnesses,
greater availability to the police for lineups and interrogations, and poor
physical appearance in court, after weeks or months of incarceration (p.
22347). One might suggest several other factors as well: the lesser ability
of detained defendants to "persuade" witnesses not to testify or to learn
about the withdrawal of key witnesses, and the likelihood that prior adverse bail and detention decisions may bias the court that imposes the
sentence. Defendants who were unfit for pretrial release are presumed
46. Apparently, the data available to Zeisel and the authors of the Vera Monograph did not
include final bail amounts and pretrial release status. Zeisel states that "[s]ome of these [detained]
defendants (their number has not been determined) make bail at some later point prior to the disposition of their case" (p. 208, n.7). See also infra note 53 and accompanying text.
47. The author cites Angel, Green, Kaufman & Van Loon, Preventive Detention: An Empirical
Analysis, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 289, 348-49 (1971).
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unfit for probation, and in any case have not had an opportunity to
demonstrate their reliability if released.
The number and seeming plausibility of these factors might suggest
that there is no need for quantitative proof of the adverse effect of pretrial
detention. Indeed, there would seem to be reason enough to minimize
pretrial detention already, such as administrative cost, inhumane jail
conditions, and violation of the presumption of innocence. But if one is
going to use statistical data to prove the "jail effect," it will have to be
done by methods more sophisticated than Zeisel's, probably by multiple
regression models that simultaneously control for the large number of
variables that can make certain defendants both more likely to be jailed
before trial and more likely to be convicted and given a custody sentence.
Zeisel states this problem clearly enough, but never satisfactorily resolves it. He first compares custody sentence rates among defendants
initially charged with each of the five classes of felony, and then separately compares the custody rate for the defendants in each of four criminal record categories. However, as Zeisel demonstrates elsewhere in his
book (p. 135, figure 36), charged offense and prior record each has an
independent impact on the severity of the sentence, so one must control
simultaneously for these two variables.4 8 Apparently recognizing this
problem, Zeisel presents data on the likelihood of conviction for jailed
and released defendants within each combination of crime class and prior
record category, finding that the jailed defendants usually fare worse.
For example, among crime Class D defendants with a prior conviction
record not leading to jail or prison, detained defendants were forty-three
percent more likely to be convicted than were released defendants. However, crime Class D includes a wide variety of offenses (for example, second degree rape, certain dangerous weapons violations, and first degree
possession of stolen property),4 9 and it is certainly possible that the jailed
Class D defendants were charged with offenses that would have given
their cases a higher likelihood of conviction, regardless of pretrial custody status.
Another competing cause of conviction rates is the strength of the
evidence in bailed versus jailed cases. Zeisel recognizes this competing
hypothesis, and attempts to evaluate it by using the amount of bail set as
a "proxy" for strength of the evidence. However, at this stage he eliminates consideration of the charged offense, using only prior record and
bail amount to categorize defendants, so that differences in the offense
48. For example, although jailed defendants charged with Class B offenses received custody
sentences 51% more often than released Class B defendants, perhaps the jailed Class B defendants
had much more serious prior records, which caused their higher custody sentence rate.
49. See VERA MONOGRAPH, supra note I, at 11.
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charged (and other unmeasured variables)5" could easily explain the bail/
jail conviction rate difference Zeisel discovers.
Given the inherent inconclusiveness of these kinds of one- and twovariable comparisons, it is unfortunate that Zeisel did not devote more
energy to analyzing the principal mechanism he suggests is responsible
for bail/jail disparities: the time-served plea. Indeed, Zeisel does not
even present any statistical evidence as to the frequency of such plea bargains and the extent to which their frequency coincides with the apparent
jail effect in different groups of defendants. It would also be useful to
distinguish between time-served pleas that produce a defendant's immediate release from jail, as opposed to those that merely recognize earlier
periods of pretrial detention for a defendant who obtains release from jail
prior to sentencing.5 1 I would expect the latter type of time-served plea
to have less appeal to defendants. Particularly in light of the notoriously
bad conditions in Manhattan's former House of Detention, an offer of the
former variety of time-served plea might well be irresistible-another
"offer that cannot be refused." 52 We also need to look at offers of noncustodial sentences made to jailed defendants (twenty-five percent of convicted "jailed" defendants in New York City did not receive a jail or
prison sentence). Such an offer can be made even earlier in the case, and
is also likely to prove irresistible.
The reasons for these omissions are not apparent from Zeisel's book,
but the earlier Vera Monograph suggests that the necessary data were
unavailable: not all time-served sentences were explicit enough to be
identifiable, and even in the smaller, in-depth sample, the data did not
always reveal whether the defendant was in custody or released at the
time of sentence.53 Somewhat surprisingly, Zeisel does not include such
critical pretrial custody status data in his list of proposed improvements
in law enforcement and research statistics, discussed in chapter five.
Clearly, future research must attempt to analyze the precise timing of the
plea offer, plea acceptance, release from custody, and sentence imposed,
so as to clarify the role of pretrial detention in the plea bargaining
process.
Assuming that Zeisel is correct in his conclusions about the "jail
50. An example of an unmeasured variable is the "prior relationship" or "stranger/nonstranger" distinction, which Zeisel elsewhere demonstrates can have a major impact on the likelihood of conviction (p. 168, figure 41) (9% of "stranger" robbery cases are dismissed or acquitted
versus 61% of "nonstranger" robbery cases).
51. Zeisel's group of "jailed" defendants includes an unknown number who made bail prior to
disposition. See supra note 46; infra text accompanying note 53.
52. See infra text at beginning of Part II, Section A; see also pp. 137-41.
53. VERA MONOGRAPH, supra note I, at 17 n.**, 18 n.*; see also supra note 46. The two
samples used in the New York study are described supra in note 1.
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effect," what should be done about it?54 He considers the possibility of
making a speedy trial available to jailed defendants, but finds this solu-

tion ineffective; a "reasonable" speedy trial limit of three months from
arrest to trial or plea would not be speedy enough, he says, since many

time-served sentences are for three months or less. This is pure speculation, of course, in the absence of any data on the number and length of
such sentences. In any case, the offer of a two month time-served plea
must gain increased coerciveness from the inability of the jailed defendant to obtain a trial within a reasonable time after the offer is made: the

classic "You mean if I'm guilty I walk and if I'm innocent I stay here for
another six months?" 55 If defendants at least had to be tried or released

from jail after three months, the prosecutor's leverage (or the "jail" part
of it, anyway) would disappear at that point, and the pressure on defend-

ants to plead guilty earlier (for example, for one or two months of time
served) would be lessened. 6
Other important possibilities of reform not considered by Zeisel57
include efforts to improve jail conditions and to avoid pretrial detention
of the defendants currently most eligible for time-served pleas, those at
the low end of the severity spectrum. Jail reform is particularly important in cities like New York; it seems difficult to imagine a machine more
powerfully equipped to coerce guilty pleas, whether or not defendants are
54. Zeisel notes in passing that it is "not immediately clear in which direction one should
eliminate the discriminatory effect. Should the conviction rates of the detained defendants be reduced, or should the conviction rates of the defendants on bail be increased?" (p. 49). However, the
implication of most of his discussion is that jailed defendants are receiving too much punishment.
55. See supra note 45.
56. Cf.MINN. R. CRIM. P. 6.06 (misdemeanor defendants in custody must be tried or released
within 10 days).
Of course, a speedy trial rule that increases the priority given to jailed defendants would probably (assuming fixed resources) further increase delays in the cases of released defendants. For an
analysis of some of the problems involved in enacting any comprehensive speedy trial reform, particularly in the cases of released defendants who willingly waive their speedy trial rights, see Frase, The
Speedy TrialAct of 1974, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 667 (1976); see also F. ZIMRING & R. FRASE, supra
note 13, at 456-92.
57. Zeisel suggests one other solution to the time-served plea problem:
Since the discrimination arises from a shift in the bargaining power of the prosecutor, it
can be reduced only by reducing that discretionary power. The only way to eliminate this
effect of pretrial detention would be an early, unchangeable decision by the prosecutor to
go to trial if the defendant fails to plead guilty to the charged crime, irrespective of whether
or not he is in pretrial detention. Under our practices this solution is not feasible. (p. 48)
(emphasis in original).
It is unclear exactly what Zeisel is proposing here. If he is saying that prosecutors should refuse plea
bargaining concessions in the case of detained defendants and insist on a straight plea or trial, the
proposal seems very unfair to detained defendants and further increases the hardship they suffer.
Perhaps he means that concessions should be offered far in advance of the point at which the defendant could be released pursuant to the offer, and the defendant would have to accept the offer immediately or it would be withdrawn. Again, it seems unfair to force jailed defendants to make such an
early and irrevocable decision. In any case, it is not clear why either of these approaches is "not
feasible."
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legally or factually guilty, than the former Manhattan House of
Detention.58
The need to reduce the use of pretrial detention in low severity cases

may be implicit in Zeisel's discussion of bail (pp. 46-47, 208-12)," 9 but the
message gets lost because of his preoccupation with proving the "jail effect." Indeed, the latter exercise points us away from what may be the
most important and needed reform in pretrial detention. Zeisel assumes
that jailed and bailed defendants are (or can statistically be made) comparable in all respects affecting their likelihood of conviction and custody
sentence. From this perspective, conviction and custody sentence rates

should be equal for the two groups of defendants; if the rates are higher
for jailed defendants, this represents injustice. It can be argued, however,

that bailed and jailed defendants are, and must remain, incomparable,
and that our goal should be to achieve a system in which only the defendants who will almost certainly be convicted are held in pretrial detention,
and of those, primarily only those defendants who would receive a custody sentence if convicted.' In contrast to such a model, Zeisel's data
reveal that thirty-two percent of the jailed defendants in New York City
are not convicted, and that twenty-five percent of the convicted, jailed
defendants do not receive a custody sentence. Thus, overall, forty-nine
58. Consider the lament of the prisoner detained there, quoted by Mills, supra note 45 (emphasis in original):
"I don't even know what we did, and I been here 10 months, I don't see no lawyer or
nothing, I ain't had a shower in two months, we locked up 24 hours a day, I got no shave,
no hot food, I ain't never been like this before, I can't stand it, I'm going to kill myself, I
got to get out, .... "
For further commentary on jail conditions, see generally R. GOLDFARB, JAILS: THE ULTIMATE
GHETTO (1975); Mattick, The Contemporary Jailsof the United States: An Unknown andNeglected
Area of Justice, in HANDBOOK OF CRIMINOLOGY 777-848 (D. Glazer ed. 1974).
59. Consider also the implications of figure 25 (p. 101), showing that a summons is widely used
in lieu of arrest for persons charged with misdemeanors and lesser offenses: about 58% of misdemeanor charges are processed by summons, and the percentage for infractions and violations combined is about 82%. Summonses are not authorized in the case of felony charges in New York City.
However, other American jurisdictions permit this, see, e.g., MINN. R. CRIM. P. 3.01, and some
European nations make extensive use of a summons-type procedure. See generally Schlesinger,
Comparative CriminalProcedure: A Pleafor Utilizing ForeignExperience, 26 BUFFALO L. REV. 361,
369-71 (1977).
60. An analagous principle is implemented in the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which provide that if an offense is a misdemeanor punishable by fine only, a summons shall be issued
in lieu of the warrant, MINN. R. CRIM. P. 3.01; suspects arrested without a warrant and charged
with such offenses "ordinarily" shall be released on citation on the scene if they agree to sign the
citation, and must be so released by the official in charge of the proposed place of detention, id. 6.01,
subd. l(l)(a)-(b).
A more radical proposal would set a goal of detaining only defendants likely to be convicted
and receive a custody sentence greaterthan the maximum duration of their pretrial detention (i.e.,
more than three months, assuming the speedy trial rule discussed supra in text following note 54).
Such an approach would largely eliminate the "time-served" plea bargaining problem, since no defendant could obtain immediate release from jail in return for a guilty plea.
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percent6 1 of the detainees suffer incarceration that is not "legitimized" by
subsequent conviction and sentencing.

Zeisel's discussion of the first problem (detained but not convicted)
is limited to a footnote, where he cites an article proposing that an evidentiary, "probable guilt" hearing be held prior to a defendant's pretrial
detention (p. 208, n.862 ). However, since many unconvicted detainees
are eventually dismissed by the prosecutor, a lot of detention can be

avoided if prosecutors simply accelerate the screening of their cases involving detained defendants.6 3 In addition, if defendants were entitled to
some sort of compensation for pretrial detention not leading to conviction, 64 the system would obviously have a good deal more incentive to
make screening and detention decisions carefully.
Similarly, efforts could be made to minimize pretrial detention for
those defendants who will not receive a custody sentence.6 5 However,

unlike the problem discussed above, here we must deal with the possibil61. The 49% consists of the 32% not convicted, plus the 17% (25% of 68%) convicted but
given a noncustodial sentence. Of course, some of these defendants may have been both readily
convictable and appropriate subjects for a custody sentence. The system simply did not bother to
achieve these results by means of formal conviction and sentence. See infra note 65.
In Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984), the Supreme Court upheld a New York statute
authorizing pretrial preventive detention ofjuveniles, and rejected the argument that such detention
must be viewed as "punishment" without conviction, since many detained juveniles have their petitions dismissed, or do not receive custodial dispositions. The Court held that "the final disposition
of a case is 'largely irrelevant' to the legality of a pretrial detention." Id. at 2415, However, much of
the Court's reasoning emphasized the traditional paternalistic treatment-oriented approach of the
juvenile court, so the holding may be limited to that context. Even if the ruling is deemed applicable
to adults, such a narrow interpretation of the constitutional limitations applicable is not inconsistent
with the view expressed here-that as a matter of policy, "wasted" pretrial detention of persons who
do not legally merit a custody sentence must be kept to an absolute minimum.
62. The author cites Thaler, Punishing the Innocent: The Needfor Due Process and the Presumption of Innocence Priorto Trial, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 441. Of course, such an explicit "prediction
of guilt" raises both theoretical and practical problems. In particular, procedures would need to be
devised to insure that the trial jury is not informed of the earlier prediction.
63. Although Zeisel tells us that 44% of all dispositions are by "dismissal" (p. 19), most often
at the preliminary hearing stage (p. 123, figure 30), it is not clear how many of these dismissals were
contested by the prosecution, nor do we know precisely how many involved detained defendants.
Assuming that a substantial number of detainees are screened unilaterally by the prosecutor at some
point, it is also unclear whether prosecutors could accelerate very many of these decisions, or
whether they would want to. Pretrial detention can be used to coerce a guilty plea, with dismissal
coming later if the defendant refuses to plead guilty or if evidence is subsequently lost. Thus, we
need more research on the timing and reasons for nonconviction in detainee cases.
64. Such compensation may be awarded in France whenever pretrial detention has caused the
defendant "a manifestly abnormal prejudice of particular gravity." CODE DE PROCEDURE PENALE
(C. PR. PFEN.] art. 149 (author's translation).
65. Cf supra note 60. It is possible, of course, that many of the defendants in Zeisel's sample
who were detained but not given custodial sentences were nevertheless considered by the court to
have served time, and that if they had been released prior to trial the court would have felt some
custody was necessary. Further research should attempt to discover the sentencing norms for released defendants in similar cases, and interviews with sentencing judges should determine what
sentence would have been given the defendant if he or she had been released prior to trial.
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ity that lowered detention rates will increase the failure to appear rate,
thus slowing down or preventing conviction. Zeisel argues that nonappearance rates are already too high and that they cannot be reduced at
the bail-setting stage, because we cannot predict future bail jumpers in
advance (pp. 49, 214). Even accepting the latter conclusion-which is
not entirely supported by the available literature on bail predictions66one cannot conclude from Zeisel's data that current nonappearance rates
are too high, nor that lower detention rates would necessarily increase
nonappearance. Although Zeisel does a good job of operationally defining the "jump rate," so as to exclude temporary or inadvertent absences, 67 we still do not know how many of these bail jumpers were likely
to have been convicted. Indeed, his data suggest that most of them were
charged with low severity crimes, for which dismissal rates are high;6 8
such failures to appear, however frequent, do not necessarily frustrate
law enforcement.6 9
Of course, if we start to release more defendants whom we expect to
be convicted and receive noncustody sentences, we must be concerned
that they may abscond. Zeisel suggests that our only feasible strategies
to reduce the nonappearance rate are to arrest more bail jumpers and
forfeit more of their bonds, but these suggestions do not exhaust the possibilities. Studies suggest that there are fewer nonappearance problems
when defendants are carefully notified of court dates, 70 and the incentive
66. See, e.g,, Ozanne, Wilson & Gedney, Towarda Theory of BailRisk, 18 CRIMINOLOGY 15160 (1980), which found that of 150 variables analyzed in three separate studies, 46 were found to be
statistically significant in predicting failure to appear. Sixteen of these "predictor" variables were
selected for further analysis because they could be readily obtained and verified at the time of pretrial
release screening, they could be objectively and efficiently applied, and they were not objectionable
on philosophical grounds. These 16 variables seemed to tap many of the same community-ties factors used since the early 1960's to make pretrial release decisions, but were significantly different in
several respects. See also Goldkamp, Questioning the Practiceof PretrialDetention: Some Empirical
Evidence from Philadelphia, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1556, 1576-85 (1984) (development
and testing of improved prediction formula).
67. Noting the problem of "involuntary" nonappearances, Zeisel defines bail jumpers to include "all persons whose arrest warrant had not been returned by the time, at least several months
later, when our data were collected and the cases recorded as not disposed" (p. 214 n.14). Such a
definition also excludes certain "intentional" nonappearances-e.g., to avoid a particularly severe
judge who would hear the case on the day set for trial.
68. See figure 57 (p. 216) (78% of bail jumpers were charged with crime Classes C, D, and E,
and had no record or an "arrests only" record); figure 29 (p. 113) (for defendants charged with crime
Classes D and E, dismissal rate was 76% with no record or a minor record, versus 20% for defendants with a major record).
69. Some of these cases may represent informal "convictions," in which the bail or other collateral forfeited by nonappearance is considered to be equivalent to a fine. Such informality is troubling, particularly in serious cases, although it is noteworthy that many countries permit conviction,
and even sentencing to incarceration, in absentia. See infra text accompanying note 72.
70.

See, e.g., NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERVICE,

How DOES

PRETRIAL

SUPERVISION AFFECT PRETRIAL PERFORMANCE? (1978) (300 randomly selected felony cases in
Washington, D.C., randomly assigned to three levels of pretrial supervision-passive, moderate, and
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to appear might also be increased by enforcing criminal penalties for willful nonappearance. Both of these alternatives may be expensive, however. A cheaper option might be to abolish bail bonds and substitute
cash deposits, thus insuring that defendants have a personal stake in the
bail forfeiture.7 ' We might also make the threat of arrest and denial of
further release more explicit to defendants being released. Finally, we
might even consider more frequent use of trial in absentia for defendants
who are clearly shown to have had notice of the charges and the trial
date. This procedure is widely used in other countries, 72 even for serious
offenses, and significantly reduces the justification for pretrial detention.
Perhaps the real reason why we refuse to release more accused defendants is that we fear them. Specifically, we fear that they will either
interfere with the evidence or witnesses, or will commit further crimes
while awaiting trial. Of course, the interference problem is immaterial if
the defendant could not be convicted even if detained. Pretrial detention
of the "dangerous" is equally hard to justify for such unconvictable defendants, and is logically unnecessary for those who will not receive custody sentences. Thus, the only "preventive detention" issue raised by my
proposed pretrial release model is the risk of "interference" by convictable defendants who will not receive a custody sentence. Assuming that
this is a serious problem-and there is little data to suggest that it is73 there are ways of dealing with it short of preventive detention at the outset of the case. These include explicit threats of revocation of release,
backed up by a willingness to follow through; use of depositions to
"freeze" witness testimony;7 4 and giving "speedy trial" priority to cases
posing the greatest risk of interference.
Other, less frequently articulated reasons for detaining defendants in
less serious cases are the desire to coerce pleas 75 and/or to informally
intensive-produced the following percentages, respectively, of subjects who made all required court
appearances: 95%, 96%, and 98%). See generally C. ESKRIDGE, PRETRIAL RELEASE PROGRAMMING: ISSUES AND TRENDS 146-48 (1983).
71. See generally F. ZIMRING & R. FRASE, supra note 13, at 313-20.
72.

See, e.g., CODE DE PROCEDURE PENALE [C. PR. PEN.] arts. 270, 319-320, 410, 412, 487-

495, 544-545, 627-641 (FRENCH CODE Of CRIM. P. arts. 270, 319-320, 410, 412, 487-495, 544-545,
627-641 (G. Koch trans. 1964)).
73. However, the high dismissal rate among cases involving a "prior relationship" between the
victim and the defendant, see infra text accompanying notes 70-82, might suggest problems of witness intimidation. Of course, these cases involve defendants whom the system already releases. We
know nothing about the witness or evidence tampering risks in low severity cases where defendants
are now being detained.
74. Cf. Schlesinger, supra note 59, at 375 (noting the willingness of European courts to use
pretrial statements of witnesses as substantive evidence, where the witness later contradicts the statement or claims a loss of memory).
75. Actually, there are a variety of law enforcement benefits to pretrial detention beyond coercing a plea, such as insuring the availability of the defendant for continued interrogation and identification procedures, and "encouraging" testimony and other forms of cooperation. There appears to
have been relatively little research done on the extent to which police make use of these opportuni-
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punish such defendants. As previously discussed, a guilty plea should
not be the price of pretrial release, and punishment through pretrial detention is clearly illegitimate. So much for the "need" to detain-but
how can such abuses be eliminated in practice? Earlier screening by
prosecutors, coupled with the release of defendants unlikely to merit a
custody sentence, can be achieved by prosecutors and judges with good
faith and high ideals, but the abuse of pretrial detention for illegitimate
purposes will not cease until the presumption of release is made explicit,
and backed up by suitable enforcement procedures. The presumption
might be phrased as follows: "No defendant may be detained unless the
prosecution establishes a strong probability that defendant will be convicted and receive a custody sentence." Expedited appeals must be permitted and relief liberally granted.
As for the possibility of increased pretrial release in more serious
cases (that is, cases involving probable custody sentences), the desire to
achieve informal preventive detention looms large and poses a major obstacle to reform. Zeisel makes reference to the preventive detention controversy, but his discussion and proposed solutions do not do justice to
the importance of this problem, and the possibility that it is the key to
bail reform in serious cases. Zeisel implies that American courts might
simply be given the explicit preventive detention powers of European and
English courts (pp. 50-51), but this will not satisfy those readers who
believe that such power must be subject to American standards of due
process and accountability. On the other hand, American experience
with detailed preventive detention statutes has been disappointing, since
the statutes are not needed and will not be used if the option of detention
under high money bail remains available.76 Thus, limiting money bail to
cases where "the danger of ffight is the sole grounds for detention"
(p. 50) (describing continental procedures) may not go far enough. We
will probably have to abolish money bail entirely, or at least provide
some procedure limiting money bail to an amount that the defendant can
afford to post.7 7 The former alternative would require amendment of
most state constitutions, which generally recognize a right to bail. Either
ties. To some extent the detainee's right to counsel provides a safeguard here. Cf Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977) (defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel attaches at the
commencement of "adversary judicial criminal proceedings-whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment"); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689

(1972).
76. See generally F. ZIMRING & R. FRAMS, supra note 13, at 334-42 (discussing the disappointing experience with the 1970 District of Columbia preventive-detention statute).
77. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 201-203, 98 Stat.
1976, 1976-85 (1984), appears to create a statutory "right to affordable bail" in federal criminal
cases. It provides that federal magistrates and judges "may not impose a financial condition [of
release] that results in the pretrial detention of the person." Id. § 203, 98 Stat. 1978 (to be codified at
18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)).
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approach would require that new procedures be devised to deal with defendants who should not be released unconditionally: standards and
hearing procedures to detain defendants who pose a demonstrable risk of
flight or misconduct, and effective use of bail revocation and penalties for
nonappearance or crimes committed while released. Abolition or limitation of money bail would require a willingness to spend the money necessary to supervise closely the whereabouts and activities of defendants
who do not pose quite enough risk to justify preventive detention.
Clearly, Zeisel's data and the implications of his analysis point in these
directions, but only for those able to look past his preoccupation with the
limits-of-law-enforcement thesis.
C. Other ImportantPolicy Issues
At the risk of making this Review longer than Zeisel's book, I have
summarized below some other areas where his book gives less attention
to important policy and research issues than the data merit. Although
most of these omissions are probably due to space limitations in the book
or to missing data in the New York City study, some may reflect a judgment that the issues are less important or that the criminal justice system
is already doing about as well as can be expected. The latter interpretation is more troubling, although Zeisel would not be the only scholar to
suggest that we lower our expectations for achieving ideal justice on a
large scale in our criminal courts.7"
1.

Victim/Offender Relationships

Zeisel, like the authors of the Vera Monograph, notes that a "prior
relationship" between victim and offender makes a case much more
likely to be dismissed, principally because such victims frequently withdraw or fail to appear in court (p. 25). Zeisel recommends that future
research and law enforcement statistical systems record "whether the offender was a stranger" (p. 261).11 Although Zeisel appears to recognize
that some of these withdrawals, such as those due to intimidation or the
"burden of further cooperation," may produce unjustified dismissals (pp.
27-28), he implies that the remainder are appropriate because "the continuation of the relationship may be more important than prosecuting the
offense which disrupted it" (p. 26). In other words, the matter is
''private."
However, the definition of a "nonstranger" used in the Vera Monograph, and apparently adopted by Zeisel, covers a wide variety of prior
78. Cf C. SILBERMAN, supra note 4.
79. Unlike the Vera Monograph, Zeisel's data rarely reflect the stranger/nonstranger distinction, an exception being figure 41 (p. 168) (61% of nonstranger robbery cases dismissed are acquitted, compared with 9% of stranger robbery cases).
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relationships: family members, in-laws, other relatives, lovers, former
spouses or lovers, neighbors, drinking and drug companions, other
friends, neighbors and acquaintances, employers and employees, landlords and tenants, junkies and dealers, prostitutes and their customers or
pimps, and other business relationships (for example, cab driver/customer) (p. 115).80 The value of continuing the prior relationship is certainly not the same in all of these cases, and it is difficult to see what
appropriate research or management use would or could be made of a
simple "stranger/nonstranger" variable.
Moreover, even if the relationship of the parties invokes significant
privacy interests, we need to know much more about the nature of the
offense charged, the suspect's likely dangerousness to nonacquaintances,
and the explicit-not inferred 8 '-reasons for withdrawal, before we can
pass judgment on whether dismissal is in the interests of justice. Finally,
even if one accepts the "stranger/nonstranger" distinction or something
similar to it, the conclusion that "stranger" cases have a higher priority
and fewer witness problems certainly requires that we reanalyze Zeisel's
"attrition" data to see how well we do in enforcing these more serious
offenses.8 2
2. Disparity Versus "Rough Justice"
The presentation of bail setting, charge reduction, and sentencing
data in the aggregate leads to the impression that, despite its many
problems and inadequacies, the criminal justice system ultimately succeeds in delivering consistent, proportionate justice, at least in relation to
charged offense and prior record. The authors of the Vera Monograph
and other recent books83 make this conclusion explicit; Zeisel only hints
at it in the introduction: "In its own terms, law enforcement, although
flawed in many respects, works reasonably well" (p. 4). Yet such "average" figures still leave room for considerable variation from case to case,
depending on the identity of the prosecutor,8 4 defense counsel, and espe80. See also VERA MONOGRAPH, supra note 1, at 19-20, 27, 67, 68, 106.
81. The researchers in the New York City study did not talk directly to the complaining witnesses (p. 115 n.2). Zeisel's analysis of the complaining witnesses' reasons for withdrawal is based on
98 cases. In some of these cases the reasons were given to defense counsel who reported them to
researchers; in others the reasons were inferred (pp. 114-15). Although the linkage is not made
explicit, table 2 (p. 111) indicates that "known" rather than inferred reasons were only present in 33
cases (out of 159 dismissed cases in the small, in-depth sample of 369 defendants-see supranote 1).
82. "Stranger" cases may also involve higher rates of reporting by victims to the police. On
the other hand, the proportion of reports leading to arrest is probably lower (p. 32, figure 9).
83. C. SILBERMAN, supra note 4, at 255; VERA MONOGRAPH, supra note 1, at xii, 133-37.
84. For a general discussion of the problems of prosecutorial discretion, and how one federal
prosecutor's office limited filing discretion through a system of internal written reasons and supervisory review, see Frase, The Decision to File Federal Criminal Charges: A Quantitative Study of
ProsecutorialDiscretion, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 246, 290-304 (1980).
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cially the judge. It is unclear whether these actor variables were included
in the New York City data, but they are certainly an important part of
any model system of criminal justice statistics, and any thorough evaluation of disposition patterns.
Sentencing disparity deserves particular attention, given the current
interest in sentencing reform. Indeed, it is arguable that reform of sentencing discretion is at least as important as (and perhaps even a prerequisite to) reform of plea bargaining and pretrial release. The relationship
between plea bargaining and sentencing is obviously a close one. There is
limited value in eliminating prosecutorial charge bargaining, as recommended in this Review, if judges remain free to impose widely different
sentences on defendants found guilty of the same offense."5 Moreover,
judicial sentencing disparity may be one of the justificationsfor plea bargaining. Through charge or sentence bargaining, entered into before the
identity of the trial judge is known, prosecutors and defense attorneys
can substitute a moderate sentence for the sentencing extremes possible
when judges have complete control over the sentence.8 6 Highly discretionary sentencing also makes it easier to mislead defendants with illusory plea bargain "discounts" from sentences that no trial judge would
impose. In any case, sentencing reform is a logical place to begin to
tackle the problem of discretion, since sentences are perhaps the most
visible, and theoretically the most important, of all discretionary criminal
justice decisions. Once we have made a firm beginning by limiting sentencing disparity, as has been done in Minnesota and elsewhere,8 7 the
need for plea bargaining reform becomes all the more compelling, since
prosecutorial charge bargaining can defeat the purposes of sentencing
reform.
As for the relationship between sentencing and pretrial release, there
is also reason to believe that reform of one cannot succeed without reform of the other, at least in the case of less serious offenses. It does little
good to decide that certain offenders should presumptively receive a
noncustody sentence if many of them are still forced to serve such
sentences while awaiting trial. To avoid such wasted incarceration, this
Review has proposed the goal of never imposing pretrial detention unless
a defendant would almost certainly receive a custody sentence. Such a
goal will be impossible to achieve in practice, however, if we do not de85. Compare the results in the state of Alaska, in which elimination of most forms of
prosecutorial plea bargaining did not appear to eliminate plea/trial differentials imposed by the
judges themselves. M. RUBINSTEIN, S. CLARKE & T. WHITE, supra note 11, at 18, 119.
86. See supra note 21.
87. The Minnesota sentencing guidelines, in effect since 1980, are published in MINN. R. CT.
263-321. For each combination of offense and prior record, the guidelines specify whether commitment to state prison is presumptively required. If it is, the guidelines specify the term within narrow
limits (e.g., 30 to 36 months).
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velop sentencing norms for low severity offenses and offenders,8 8 thus
making it easier to predict the probable sentence at the time pretrial release decisions are made.
3.

Varieties of PriorRecord

Zeisel gives considerably less emphasis than the authors of the Vera
Monograph to the prior record data available from the New York City
study, perhaps because he objects to the way in which some prior records
were used: arrests not leading to conviction appeared to count as a "minor" record, intermediate between "no prior record" and "prior convictions without imprisonment" (pp. 45, 113 (figure 29), 135 (figure 36)).89
What we are not told by either Zeisel or the Vera Monograph, perhaps
because the data were not available from the New York City study, is
how many of these prior arrests without conviction represented formal
pretrial diversion (or informal, "one more chance" dismissals) of convictable suspects. Zeisel wants to expunge all arrests not leading to conviction (pp. 45-46), but overlooks the possibility that the prosecutor's office
will retain a record of such dispositions. Moreover, if the defendant was
provably guilty the first time, consideration of the prior incident may be
proper, at least in deciding whether to formally prosecute a new charge.
Until this policy dilemma is resolved, we will not know how to evaluate
current disposition practices and design new statistical systems.
4. Other Missing Data
Some studies have suggested that the race of the defendant and/or
the victim may play a key role in the disposition of the case,90 but this
variable is never mentioned by Zeisel, perhaps because it was not recorded in the New York City data. Nor did he analyze the effect, if any,
of different types of defense counsel (full-time public defender, other appointed counsel, retained counsel), which is at least a proxy for the social
class of the defendant, if not a measure of the different styles and impact
of these different forms of representation. Finally, nothing is said about
any time-lapse variables, such as the length of pretrial detention and the
88. Compare the new sentencing guidelines which became effective in the State of Washington
on July 1, 1984, which apparently are not limited to felonies, but which provide presumptive noncustody sentences for only 3 out of 130 crime and prior record combinations. WASHINGTON SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 7 (1983); see also Alschuler, supra note
28, at 956-61 (proposing a "penal order" system modeled after European procedures in which the
prosecution would normally decide which misdemeanor defendants should be offered a noncustodial
sentence, whether they plead guilty or demand trial).
89. See also VERA MONOGRAPH, supra note 1, at 21, table F.
90. See, e.g., Zimring, Eigen & O'Malley, PunishingHomicide in Philadelphia: Perspectiveson
the Death Penalty, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 227, 232-33 (1976) (black felony-murder defendants with
white victims received more severe sanctions and had more jury trials than black felony-murder
suspects with black victims).
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delays between each step of the disposition process. Such data are obviously critical to evaluation of "speedy trial" and pretrial detention issues,
and as suggested earlier in the discussion of plea bargaining, they may
also shed considerable light on the reasons for a particular disposition.
All of these variables may have less impact on disposition than plea bargaining concessions and pretrial detention, but their potential impactand the possibility of injustice-cannot be ignored in any thorough
evaluation.
CONCLUSION

There is certainly much that is wrong with the quality of criminal
justice in the United States, and much that we still do not know about
how to set it right. Research and reform, however, are usually difficult,
expensive, and slow. It is also undoubtedly true that the crime-controlling power of the criminal justice system is limited, and that efforts to
even modestly increase that power are equally difficult, expensive, and
slow. But these basic truths provide all the more reason to be wary of a
book which implies that research and reform are of lesser importance,
and which argues forcefully that the "answer" to our crime-control needs
is to be found outside the criminal justice system.
One thing that the criminal justice system does not need in the near
future is a period of neglect, benign or otherwise. Problems such as coercive plea bargaining and unnecessary pretrial detention will not go away
by themselves; they are too entrenched in recent traditions, and too convenient for those responsible for these decisions. Moreover, the ideal
time to address these problems may be right now, before the end of the
current "baby bust" cycle of declining crime rates and stable, if not declining, arrest rates.9 1 Perhaps a similar demographic "window of op91. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTS 1983, at 43, table 1 (1984) (for seven "index" crimes measured, rates of crime
reported to the police, per 100,000 inhabitants, peaked in 1979, 1980, or 1981, depending on the
offense, and then declined steadily through 1983); id. at 168 (total number of arrests (not adjusted
for population growth) continued to rise through 1982, but then declined by 3% in 1983 (5% for
index crimes)); id. (arrests of persons under 18 fell 10% in 1983 (8% percent for index crimes)); see
also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE

UNITED STATES 1983, at 3, table 2 (1984) (victimization rates per 1,000 population peaked in 1979

or 1981 for five surveyed offenses; peaks for the other four offenses were in 1974, 1975, or 1977; rates
for all offenses declined from 1981 to 1982 and preliminary figures for 1983 show further declines
(except for rape)). Some observers have suggested that these declines are also due to increased imprisonment rates and perhaps even the changing fads of ghetto teenagers. See Zimring, Figures
Suggest Violent Crime is Going Out of Fashion, Minneapolis Star & Tribune, Aug. 2, 1984, at 19A,
col. 1.
The discussion in the text focuses on court caseloads, which should remain stable or decline in
the late 1980's. In contrast, prison populations continue to rise and may not reach a peak until 1990.
See generally Blumstein, Cohen & Miller, DemographicallyDisaggregatedProjectionsof Prison Population, 8 J. CRIM. JUST. 1 (1980). My analysis assumes that plea bargaining and pretrial release
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portunity" applies to Zeisel's proposed reforms in primary education, but
recent increases in elementary school enrollments suggest that the window is already closing, whereas the newest baby boom generation will
not reach its crime-producing peak for another fifteen years.92 If we are
going to make significant changes in our system of criminal justicewhether to improve the quality of justice or to better control crime-the
time to do this is now, when reduced public anxiety and a better ratio of
resources to caseload permit room for reform and experimentation.
Time is of the essence, however. Although the lull in crime rates may
last until the mid-1990's, reduced public interest in law enforcement will
eventually follow the drop in crime rates, and pressures will build to reduce expenditures for criminal justice.
What should our research and reform priorities be in the near future? In research, Zeisel is clearly correct: we need more studies like the
one conducted in New York City, and much of this information should
be routinely collected for all cases in the system, so that it can be used for
management as well as research purposes. However, this Review has
argued that such future research and statistical systems must incorporate
even more variables and more sophisticated analysis than employed by
either Zeisel or the authors of the earlier Vera Monograph.
The most comprehensive studies will probably only be feasible in a
few jurisdictions, and careful consideration must be given to the selection
of such jurisdictions. Although New York City provided a natural setting for "pilot" research, in light of the presence of cooperative local
authorities, the availability of interested and experienced researchers, and
the probability of dramatic findings, the limitations of further research in
such a city should be recognized. First, no matter how similar the basic
functioning of criminal justice is in all American cities, criminal justice in
New York City is still in a class by itself. The problems are bigger, and
the solutions are even more difficult, expensive, and slow than in cities of
only ordinary hugeness. Second, research in any system as large as that
of New York City is more likely to encounter missing case files or entries,
poor cross-referencing, vague memories, and problems of pending cases
in prospective samples.93 In particular, future research should probably
be located in a city that has implemented the computerized Prosecutor's
reform can be achieved without increasing the number of persons sent to prison; the same may not
be true for sentencing reform at least in some jurisdictions.
92. McGrath, Crime Expert Foresees Temporary Crime Decline, Minneapolis Star & Tribune,
May 15, 1984, at 1B, col. 1 (based on a speech in Minneapolis to the Police Foundation by Harvard
Professor James Q. Wilson).
93. In the New York sample, 40 cases were eliminated from the larger sample described supra
in note 1, because the files could not be located; another 37 cases were dropped because they were
still pending when data collection ceased. Excluding juvenile and youthful offender cases, these two
missing data items accounted for about 5% of all cases. VERA MONOGRAPH, supra note 1, at 1-2.

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:212

Management Information System (p. 230), which already captures most
charge and custody variables, thus minimizing the need for expensive
manual retrieval of this information from case files.
As for reform priorities, we should focus our efforts on the interrelated problems of sentencing,94 plea bargaining, and pretrial release. Our
short-term goals should be to eliminate at least the more coercive types
of plea bargaining concessions, 95 and to avoid pretrial detention in all but
the clearest, most serious cases. 96 Zeisel correctly recognizes that these
are two of the areas where our criminal courts most often fail to live up
to our ideals of justice, but he gives us relatively little guidance for reform. Nevertheless, his data point the way toward the most needed
changes.
What about improvements in crime control? If we accept the
broadest implications of Zeisel's thesis about the crime-control limits of
law enforcement,9 7 then we have all the more reason to place greater
emphasis on the quality of justice in criminal courts-for we need not
fear that a fair and humane criminal justice system will leave us at the
mercy of criminals. On the other hand, if modest improvements in our
crime-fighting efforts are possible-and Zeisel has not proven the contrary9 8 -we may have to decide, in allocating short-term criminal justice
dollars, whether increased crime control or a higher quality of justice is
more important. 99 In that case, I submit that we should prefer improved
justice because that choice is more consistent with our ideals, and because a fair and humane criminal justice system promotes respect for the
law, just as a corrupt system undermines it.
Notwithstanding the critical tone of this Review, it is important to
end by recognizing the significant value of Zeisel's book, for academic as
well as nonacademic readers. Academics will find in it unique data, valuable new ideas for research, and an essential blueprint for the design of
future system-wide empirical research and statistical systems. Nonacademic readers will benefit from Zeisel's forceful and elegant demonstration of the crime-control limits of law enforcement: the criminal law
cannot drastically reduce crime, particularly in periods of rising "crime
demographics" and major social upheaval, such as we experienced in the
1960's and 1970's. Ironically, it is precisely at such times that the public
pressure is greatest to use the criminal law to "do something" about
94. See supra text accompanying notes 85-88.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 34-42.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 59-77.
97. See supra text following note 3.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 4-17.
99. On the other hand, we may be able to pursue both goals simultaneously, if criminal justice
budgets remain fairly constant while crime rates and caseloads decline. See supra text accompanying
notes 91-92.
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crime, and public expectations are likely to far exceed our capacity to
effect change 1 -at least by means of the criminal law, and perhaps by
any instrument of public policy.
But the crisis years are over, for the moment. What the public most
needs to hear in the 1980's is that, although crime rates are falling, the
criminal justice system needs our funding and attention more than ever.
Now is the time to remake our system into one we can be proud of, and
hope that the changes last through crime waves of the future. There may
be some backsliding later on, but let us at least try to improve our position while we can. To paraphrase Zeisel, we need standards and procedures for criminal justice that "will hold when the dangerous years begin
and will endure until they are over" (pp. 87-88).

100. See supra note 3.

